The Israeli Decision to Go to War in June 1967

Abstract

ﺗﺪﻋﻲ اﻟﺮواﻳﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ أن ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967 اﻧﺪﻟﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ وﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺨﻄﻂ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺳﻠﻔ ﺎ، وﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮة اﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺻﺪر ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺒﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ وﻣﺬﻛﺮات ودراﺳﺎت ووﺛﺎﺋﻖ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ؛ ﺗﺮﺳﻢ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﻨﺎﻗﻀﺔ ﺗﻤﺎﻣًﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻻدﻋﺎء. ﺗﻌﺎﻟﺞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ ﻓﻲ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻗﺮارات اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ، وﻫﻲ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﻮﻟﺔ رﺳﻤﻴًﺎ وﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴًﺎ اﺗﺨﺎذَ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب، ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ودورﻫﺎ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻄ ﺎ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪًا؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺳﻌﺖ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻟﺨﻠﻖ اﻟﻔﺮﺻﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﺸﻦ اﻟﺤﺮب ورﻓﻀﺖ أي ﺣﻞ ﺳﻠﻤﻲ ﻟÑزﻣﺔ، واﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻻﺗﺨﺎذ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺮار. وﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ، واﻟﺨﻄﻂ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺿﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ارﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻐﺮض ﺗﻮﺳﻴﻊ ﺣﺪود إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967، إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﻔﻲ إﺷﻜﻮل. Te official Israeli narrative of the June 1967 War depicts the country as having been dragged unwillingly into a conflict for which it had not planned. A close inspection of a number of detailed sources, scattered across a variety of published Hebrew materials, paint a picture entirely at odds with such a claim however. In this paper, the author addresses the Israeli decision to go to war in June 1967 by examining the steps taken by the Israeli government—legally, the only body mandated to declare war. Te author also examines the developments in the stance taken by the Israeli military command, which was instrumental in the decision to go to war. At the time, the Israeli military worked to create the right opportunity to declare war, refusing to accept any attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict and coerced the government into war through a variety of means.