Latest Articles

This article explains underlying drivers of the general contours of Chinese foreign policy. Since the Cold War, China has increasingly been playing the role of a major power but demonstrates hesitancy in some theatres and has not developed its full capacities to that end. This article attends to the study of “Strategic Culture”, a framework which helps explain ideas generated from the history, culture, and societal narratives of a state, and which place general parameters that indicate preferred foreign policy options. Strategic Culture does not cause action, but helps define potential acceptable options. It is complementary to other explanations around the importance of factors such as distribution of material capabilities, decision maker’s idiosyncrasies, and alliance commitments. In particular, strategic culture helps understand long-term foreign policy patterns.

This section highlights the most significant political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we present a collection of documents pertaining to the period from July 1 to October 31, 2023.

Book Title: The Lost Narrative [Arabic] Author: Farouk Sharaa Edition: 1st Year of publication: 2015 Publisher: ACRPS, Doha/Beirut Pages: 495

Borders between Morocco and Algeria have been closed since the Hotel Atlas Asni terrorist attacks in Marrakech on August 24, 1994. Investigations found the groups that carried out the attacks had their origins in Algeria. Moroccan authorities responded by implementing a visa requirement for Algerians, and Algeria retaliated by closing the borders between the two countries. This paper looks for a solution to the re-normalization of relations between the two countries. Looking at the history of Moroccan-Algerian relations, it focuses on the Marrakech incident and the issue of Western Sahara, and their impact on the bilateral relations within a context of tension, and regional competition where each remains entrenched.

This study examines how international economic and political matters are interrelated within the context of the Covid- 19 pandemic's outbreak as well as its serious effects on global economy. It argues that the International Political Economy (IPE) may provide answers to how the pandemic shapes (or fails to shape) international economic relations. The paper explores how, as a transdisciplinary field, IPE helps to understand patterns of change and continuity in global economics and politics in the wake of the pandemic, and IPE's contribution to global health research as well. The study defends the hypothesis that the state has been and is still present at the heart of neoliberal capitalism, and that it has preserved its foundations within a heterodoxy neoliberal trend heading towards more authoritarian neoliberalism, and steadily moves from market to state neoliberalism. The study also advocates positioning the Political Economy of Health at the center of health research; as long as health is considered a transnational issue. It goes on to discuss the failure of international institutions to enable international cooperation to confront the pandemic, a failure forged by the rise of nationalist populism.

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

Aggression is the door that lets in all other forms of crime. Therefore, it is necessary to criminalize it rather than just ban it. Although it was difficult to realize that these two goals are separately essential, they were ultimately reached through the 1945 UN Charter that banned the use of force in international relations and the 1998 Rome Statute that stated the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the practice of this jurisdiction was put on hold until 2010, pending the holding of the review conference that would define aggression and the conditions of the court’s practice of its jurisdiction in this crime in compliance with the UN Charter. This alignment between the UN Charter and the amendment seems logical at first as long as it halts war. The Security Council gets to decide whether the committed act was an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security. But, the question is the following: Did the amendment of the Rome Statute complement the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC in the field of aggression or did it entrench the council’s dominance over the court?

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.