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ﺗﺮﺻﺪ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﺗﺠﺎﻫﺎت اﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺴﻌﻮدي ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﻻﻋﺘﺮاف ﺑﺈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، اﺳﺘﻨﺎدا إﻟﻰ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻤﺆﺷﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﺎم 2016. وﺗﺄﺗﻲ أﻫﻤﻴﺔ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺸﻬﺪﻫﺎ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ وﺻﻮل دوﻧﺎﻟﺪ ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ إﻟﻰ ﺳﺪة اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة اÇﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ؛ إذ أﺑﺮزت اﻻﺻﻄﻔﺎﻓﺎت اÅ ﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة ﻣﻴﻠ ﺎ ﻟﺪى ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ إﻋﺎدة ﺗﺼﻨﻴﻒ اÇﻋﺪاء واﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎء، وﻇﻬﺮت أﺻﻮات ﻋﺪة ﺗﻨﺎدي ﺑﺘﻄﺒﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﻣﻊ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ ﺑﻤﺒﺮر اﻟﺘﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪاء إﻳﺮان، أو ﺣﺮﻛﺎت اÅﺳﻼم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ وﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ اÅﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺣﻤﺎس. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﺣﻤﺎس Tis paper relies on findings from the 2016 Arab Opinion Index to chart Saudi public attitudes towards a number of issues related to the Palestinian Cause, and specifically how Saudis feel about a potential normalization of diplomatic relations between their country and Israel. Tis latter question has added urgency in the present-day climate in the Arab world, with the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House underscoring increasing demands within a number of Arab states for a normalization of ties with Israel, which some see as a natural ally against Iran or political Islamist groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).

This study measures Arab public opinion regarding Palestine, whether it is considered a central Arab issue or only a Palestinian one. It analyses how Arab citizens define themselves as either "one nation", meaning that every Arab populace is part of a larger nation with shared concerns and destiny or as belonging to individual "nation states", where country is defined by its own specific characteristics and concerns. It also analyses the relationship of this belief to their outlook on the Palestinian issue. This study focuses on the ACRPS Arab Opinion Index results since 2011.

Results from the Arab Opinion Index indicate that the Arab public is strongly conscientious of the threat posed by Zionism. Since 2011, Israel has continuously been identified by Arab respondents as the single greatest threat to collective Arab security, ahead of both the United States and Iran. The survey data also demonstrate that the Arab peoples are opposed to mutual diplomatic recognition between their countries and Israel, despite the fact that a number of Arab countries have already concluded peace treaties with Israel. When asked to justify their positions, respondents offered explanations which went beyond security concerns, describing Israel as a “colonialist” and “expansionist” state which is racist towards Arabs.

​What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index's 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance.

Examining the negative effects on the economies of oil-exporting Arab countries as a result of the current imbalance in the international monetary system, this paper finds that the imbalance is mainly represented in the continuation of the dollar as the central reserve currency of the Gulf States. As long as this imbalance exists, it postulates, the surpluses achieved by these countries in their balance of foreign payments ends up as dollar-denominated reserves deposited in the US government treasury or as US bonds. In other words, as loans countries with financial surpluses Gulf States give to the richest economy in the world in return for meager interest rates instead of investing them in high-yielding productive projects that could increase demand in the global economy, drive up employment rates, and help protect against crises and instability. This study aims to start a debate about the need for the Gulf countries to take part in efforts to reform the international monetary system, and join developing nations that spend on infrastructure and sustainable development instead of on defense. This paper sees such a move as ensuring that the Gulf States would then participate in reforming global governance and the development of the international monetary system. Gulf countries should seriously consider joining the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank, as well as establish a trans-regional bank between Asian and Arab countries, as a more advanced step.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

This study examines the ability of network technology to challenge despotism regimes. It thus applies two theoretical approaches. The first is the "Prisoner's dilemma" and the "despot/jailer's dilemma" and the second is the "case study", which studies a number of cases of "network technology", whether used by protest groups or by authoritarian regimes, to determine the extent (and direction) of their impact in practice. The study concludes that network technology — through challenging the logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" and reversing it to become the "jailer's dilemma" — can, theoretically, pose an element of weakness for despotism regimes. However, in reality, network technology can be used by these regimes with the same effectiveness, to respond to mass protests supported by technology. This indicates that network technology can be seen as a neutralizing factor, the impact of which should be studied relative to the impact of other factors.

This article poses the question of reform of the security sector in the period of Arab democratic transition by looking at the terms of reference for reform, the intersection between security policies and the political regime, and the enabling factors for security reform within an Arab context. The fundamental question facing Arab states concerns how to couple security and freedom and security and rights and justice. That is, how can the security agencies carry out their job without impinging on fundamental individual rights and freedoms? How can the state guarantee security and defend liberties at the same time? The article takes the view that security sector reform is part of the political transition process in Arab countries. Because the security establishment was a means to strengthen the regime and endorse its authoritarianism, any democratic transition aspiring to overcome the elements of the crisis must take into account the need to review the security sector.

Globally, many countries are implementing decentralization programs as a means of promoting both democratic and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, however, scholarship has yet to offer a comprehensive framework within which to assess and reform central-local relations. This article seeks to overcome the "division of labor" that has long separated analyses of administrative and political structures, and to provide stronger conceptual vocabulary for describing and analyzing the complexities of centralization and decentralization in both administration and politics. After developing two distinct continua of administrative and political centralization/ decentralization, the paper then combines them in a single matrix able to highlight the wide range of strategies and outcomes that emerge from the complex interplay of the two spheres. Depending on where a country lies within the matrix, it is argued, decentralization strategies may do more harm than good. Devolution strategies are especially problematic in settings with strong local leaders, and should never be attempted without careful analysis of the preexisting character of central-local ties.