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This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

This study provides a discussion and analysis of the circumstances that led to the military occupation of the core of the state and government in contemporary Algeria, and the ramifications for the process of building political and legal institutions, and the democratic transition experience. The study employs the concepts of populism and neopatrimonialism to paint a picture of the path taken by the government in Algeria since independence. Populism describes the ideology that sanctified the one-party state and revolutionary legitimacy, while neopatrimonialism is the resulting shape taken by the exercise of political power. Framing these two concepts within their historical context provides an understanding of the circumstances of the army's seizure of power and its identification with the state. It clarifies the reasons for its refusal to redistribute power within the society after the establishment of political pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.

Despite high levels of mass mobilization in the past, Palestinian society today finds itself polarized and demobilized. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has gained control as a governing apparatus and has become increasingly authoritarian in nature. But the PA does not have complete control over the territories. This variation in control allows isolation of the effect of the PA's authoritarian nature on mobilization patterns and social dynamics. The study argues that mobilization has systematically declined in places where the PA has more direct control. Counter-intuitively, political mobilization today is more prevalent in areas under direct Israeli occupation. Findings suggest the PA has a direct role in this dynamic, using selective cooptation and repression. Overall, authoritarian strategies in the Palestinian territories have led to decreased capacity for mobilization.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

This paper highlights the role of the armed forces and their impact on the process of political transition, and discusses civil-military relations in their various aspects: the state, society and the armed forces per se, in order to reveal the main pillars that constitute a balance between the power of political institutions (legislative and executive) and the military power of the army. Such a balance would lead to the subduing of the army to the civil authority, and confine military activities to security and defense. The paper focuses on the common characteristics shared by states that have succeeded in building democratic armies. To conclude, the author presents a set of recommendations addressed to activists and democrats, on what ought to be done and what should be avoided in the security-defense field during the process of democratic army building.

ﻓﻲ ﺧﻀﻢ اﺧﺬ واﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤّﻰ إﻋﻼﻣﻴًﺎ "ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ"، ﺑﻴﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ا رﺑﻊ؛ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻃﺮق ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. وﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﺧﺘﻼط اوراق ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪ، اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺐ؛ ن ﺛﻤﺔ "ﺗﺸﺎﺑﻜ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، و"اﺷﺘﺒﺎﻛ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى، وﺛﻤﺔ "إﺟﻬﺎض" ﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ ﻋﺮﺑﻲﱟ ﻣﺄﻣﻮلٍ، وﺛﻤﺔ دﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮرﻳﺔ ﺿﺎرﺑﺔ ﺟﺬورﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ، وﻫﻨﺎك ﻗﻮى ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎوﻫﺎم، وأﻃﺮوﺣﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺼﺮ. ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ وﺻﻒ اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ارﺑﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﺎد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻌﺾ أنّ ﻛﻞ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ أﺻﺒﺢ وراء اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ، وﺗﻢّ ﺗﺠﺎوزه ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ أﺣﺪﺛﻬﺎ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ، وﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺪد ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﺪة أﺷﺪ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن، ارﻫﺎب. This paper will attempt to approach the present crisis between Qatar and a group of four countries formed of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt from a number of perspectives. The complexity of the present situation means that a process of deconstruction is required before the problem can be solved. Specifically, the present crisis reveals how the countries involved are both intertwined and in conflict, simultaneously; and how the players in question are in conflict over attempts to undo the Arab Spring. The conflicts between Qatar and the remaining countries have roots which stretch into history, and they also demonstrate that any belief that the birth of the modern nation-state would end those rivalries was misguided.

The Arab Opinion Index (2019/ 2020) offers interesting data on public opinion about political regimes. Our study used Principal Component Analysis to evaluate the public opinion trends toward the suitability of some political regimes for Arab countries. It is clear from the the first conclusion that the Arab citizen adheres to the democratic priority, despite other priorities related to religious and security concerns. However, it seems that the political elite did not give much importance to this priority; this is why the Arab countries experienced a series of failures in the democratic process. The second conclusion is that some countries share similarities, which differ from other groups of Arab societies. Our method helps to better understand the factors and components behind the differences or similarities between Arab countries.

Although women have been present in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since its inception, their status in the organization and political role has been restricted by Brotherhood thinking that promotes a division of roles in society on the basis of biological difference, and that emphasizes the primary role for women being in the private sphere and their central function being in the family. During the short period of democratic opening up that followed the January 25 revolution, the political participation of Brotherhood women increased. Following the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, women went beyond the frameworks and roles assigned to them. They took to the streets and for the first time in the history of the Brotherhood were at the forefront of the movement of protest and opposition against the political regime. In spite of these visible developments, this paper holds that these shifts derived from the absence of Brotherhood men, and does not reflect a shift in the ideology. For these development to have an impact on the power relations between men and women in the movement, and to lead to the political and organizational empowerment of women, there should be a fundamental change in the movement’s vision of women in general.

This study seeks to provide a preliminary diagnosis potential and opportunitiesand the obstacles which impede the reform of the military sector in the Arab world through the analysis of the most important trends and indicators positively or negatively regarding to the rationalization of the military institution in the Arab world, taking in consideration many experiences and the best practices prevailing in many democratic countries.This study attempts to answer these questions: What positive measures have been taken for the army to become controlled and under the responsibility of civil institutions? What is the degree of openness of the military institution and its interaction with the citizens, the media and civil society? How and why the enhancement of transparency within the army will contribute to the promotion of democratic transformation in the Arab countries?

The author here examines the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian political process after the victory of the January 25 Revolution with a focus on former president Mohamed Morsi's one year in office. The paper begins by analyzing the structural developments and accompanying political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood while it was a force in the country's political opposition, and how the party reflected on its behavior after the January Revolution in general, but especially during Morsi's reign. The paper focuses on what is considered an exceptional moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood: when it went from being an opposition group to taking power in a formal government setting. It examines this extraordinary shift in light of the major challenges of managing the Egyptian state. The paper concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not disappear from the political scene given its deep integration into the Egyptian social fabric, and discusses strategies and paths that the organization could adopt in the post-coup era.