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Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

The success and widespread deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) have raised awareness of the technology's economic, social, and political consequences. Each new step in the development and application of AI is accompanied by speculations about a supposedly imminent but largely fictional artificial general intelligence (AGI) with (super-)human capacities, as seen in the unfolding discourse about capabilities and impact of large language models (LLMs) in the wake of ChatGPT. These far- reaching expectations lead to a discussion on the societal and political impact of AI that is largely dominated by unfocused fears and enthusiasms. In contrast, this article provides a framework for a more focused and productive analysis and discussion of AI's likely impact on one specific social field: democracy. First, it is necessary to be clear about the workings of AI. This means differentiating between what is at present a largely imaginary AGI and narrow artificial intelligence focused on solving specific tasks. This distinction allows for a critical discussion of how AI affects different aspects of democracy, including its effects on the conditions of self-rule and people's opportunities to exercise it, equality, the institution of elections, and competition between democratic and autocratic systems of government. This article shows that the consequences of today's AI are more specific for democracy than broad speculation about AGI capabilities implies. Focusing on these specific aspects will account for actual threats and opportunities and thus allow for better monitoring of AI's impact on democracy in an interdisciplinary effort by computer and social scientists.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

Aggression is the door that lets in all other forms of crime. Therefore, it is necessary to criminalize it rather than just ban it. Although it was difficult to realize that these two goals are separately essential, they were ultimately reached through the 1945 UN Charter that banned the use of force in international relations and the 1998 Rome Statute that stated the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the practice of this jurisdiction was put on hold until 2010, pending the holding of the review conference that would define aggression and the conditions of the court’s practice of its jurisdiction in this crime in compliance with the UN Charter. This alignment between the UN Charter and the amendment seems logical at first as long as it halts war. The Security Council gets to decide whether the committed act was an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security. But, the question is the following: Did the amendment of the Rome Statute complement the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC in the field of aggression or did it entrench the council’s dominance over the court?

An academic workshop to be hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will examine the regional implications of a long-term drop in oil prices on oil producing states in the Arab region. Made urgent by a sharp decrease in the global benchmark oil price, from US$110 per barrel to $40 per barrel in the 12 months leading up to September, “A Drop in World Oil Prices: Implications for Oil-Exporting Countries” will be held at the Al Mukhtasar Hall in Doha’s Ritz-Carlton Hotel on Saturday, November 7, 2015. While participation in the event will be limited to selected experts, attendance will be open to the media and the general public.

Iran, over the past four decades, lived through a state of continuous alert to defend itself against the threats surrounding it and targeting its national security. Over that period, Iran did not enjoy clear recognition of its legitimacy from the major powers, the United States in particular. This created ongoing anxiety and restricted Iran’s efforts of “preserving the regime”, which Ayatollah Khomeini made the highest duty. These circumstances had tangible effects on Iranian national security and its strategy. The article sees that the nuclear agreement might be the beginning of a new phase. Via the agreement, Iran feels it has gained the recognition of the international community, and acknowledgement of its demand for legitimacy. Most importantly for Iran, the agreement shifts it away from the obsession with security and stability, and encourages it to bring out the features of the “Iranian model” in the region. The paper also discusses the fears of neighboring states and Iran’s efforts to reassure them. The positions of the political currents and the power centers in Iran are also considered as well as their differences over the pluses and minuses of the agreement.

US and Gulf relations are based on more than self-interest, but common selfinterest is always a key (or the key) factor in shaping an alliance and strategic relationship. The key common self-interests that drives US and Arab Gulf relations are security – the need to deal with Iran, fighting extremism, and securing the flow of petroleum exports out of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to meet the needs of the global economy, and to provide the key source of income for the Gulf states. This study explains why the United States maintains close ties with its Arab strategic partners in the Gulf. The study finds out that the US and its Gulf strategic partners face serious challenges, including domestic political change in the US, divisions between Arab states, the impact of regional conflicts and instability, and the growing role of non-Western powers.

This paper discusses the relationship between Egypt’s military and security institutions, on the one hand, and the forces of the revolutionary movement since January 25 2011, on the other. It evaluates this relationship by looking at how it evolved during Egypt’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. It achieves this by breaking events down into three main phases: an initial transitional phase managed directly by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); Mohamed Morsi’s presidency; and the revolutionary movement after Morsi’s ouster. Based on observations of the three main junctures, this paper carries out a detailed reading of the major events in each phase and analyzes the impact that each had when it came to shaping the relationship between the military and security institutions. The paper sees distinct characteristics of the relationship between these central institutions at each phase, and assesses the impact of these different moments on the political process in Egypt more generally