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Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This article addresses an epistemological question related to the methodological impasse in political science through a reading of selected conceptual orientations in Gregory Bateson's thought. It advances the hypothesis that methodological difficulty does not primarily stem from analytical tools as such, but rather from the underlying frameworks through which political action is understood. Drawing on an analytical-interpretive approach, the article examines concepts such as "dysfunction as a patterned regularity", the "double bind", and "second-order learning", with the aim of questioning linear modes of explanation in political analysis and approaching politics as a network of interrelated relations and paradoxical repetitions. The discussion also engages, comparatively, with selected contributions by Niklas Luhmann, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, in order to highlight shifts in the production of meaning in analyses of power and to delineate the limits of dominant approaches. The article concludes that a Batesonian perspective offers epistemological possibilities for understanding political complexity by foregrounding context, relational dynamics, and patterned dysfunction, beyond models based on linear causality and predictive techniques.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

The book focused on the study of the US case, examining the approaches of the force on which it relied to control the course of change in the international system, and analyzing it for its own strengths.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

This paper methodically studies the relationship between the functions of media organizations and their ownership. The material examined by the author is the content of daily Sudanese newspapers; the hypothesis being tested, from the prism of political economy, is whether or not there is a direct correlation between the ownership of a newspaper and the bias in its content. The paper begins with a survey of editorial content from several Sudanese newspapers and explores the influence of both private sector and public sector funding on their editorial content. The author concludes that despite the presence of a diverse media environment in Sudan, a classically authoritarian power structure reigns over the Sudanese media. This remains true even in the case of privately owned, independent papers, where the loyalty paid by the media owners to the government is not desired.

​​​​​This study examines the role of civil society organizations in supporting and enhancing youth participation in peacebuilding within the current peace process in Yemen. It investigates how these organizations' programs affect the type and effectiveness of youth participation in the peacebuilding process. The study uses in-depth interviews with representatives of civil society organizations as well as youth activists who participate in the peacebuilding programs. The results demonstrate that while organizations play an important role in supporting youth participation in peacebuilding, their programs do not necessarily lead to substantive and effective participation for youth either in the negotiation process or decision-making. Furthermore, the study highlights the differences between youth and civil society organizations regarding the peace process definition, the expected roles of actors involved, and the program outcomes. Additionally, it identifies several factors that influence the effectiveness of programs, including the expected role of the United Nations vs. reality, the coordination process between civil society organizations and alliances, the impact of funding, and challenges posed by the conflict environment in Yemen and its effects on program implementation and youth participation. Overall, this study provides a detailed analysis of the insights, challenges, and opportunities for youth engagement in the peacebuilding process through civil society in Yemen, offering observations and results that can be applicable and useful in other conflict contexts.