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This study attempts to identify the roles of economic diplomacy actors inside and outside capital cities. By presenting international examples it creates a comparative study to explain the evolution of economic diplomatic action, not only in Morocco – the subject of the study – but also globally. To carry out this analysis the present study argues that there are no longer pure national issues, even those that represent the core of national sovereignty, such as budget, taxes, or development. It suggests that nothing can isolate a country from its surroundings, and that economic diplomacy necessarily involves a country’s essential internal issues. This challenges existing Arabic writings, which put economic diplomacy in the context of traditional diplomacy without differentiating between the various areas of the field.

Aggression is the door that lets in all other forms of crime. Therefore, it is necessary to criminalize it rather than just ban it. Although it was difficult to realize that these two goals are separately essential, they were ultimately reached through the 1945 UN Charter that banned the use of force in international relations and the 1998 Rome Statute that stated the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the practice of this jurisdiction was put on hold until 2010, pending the holding of the review conference that would define aggression and the conditions of the court’s practice of its jurisdiction in this crime in compliance with the UN Charter. This alignment between the UN Charter and the amendment seems logical at first as long as it halts war. The Security Council gets to decide whether the committed act was an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security. But, the question is the following: Did the amendment of the Rome Statute complement the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC in the field of aggression or did it entrench the council’s dominance over the court?

The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.

The relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and its effect on the Lebanese state is here examined. Divided into five parts the study first tackles Iran’s movements in Lebanese space and their connection to Hezbollah’s evolution. The second part focuses on Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and on Hezbollah as an intervention tool. The third part describes Hezbollah’s relationship with Lebanon since the party’s creation as well as the Taif Agreement and the subsequent change in the foundations of that relationship. The fourth part sheds light on the intervention of Iran and Syria in the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Finally, the fifth part explores Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

An agreement signed by the Russian Foreign Minister and his US counterpart in Moscow has taken observers by surprise due to its timing and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement in Moscow was the natural culmination of a series of events impacting the situation in Syria, including changes to the composition of Barack Obama’s Administration and an overall shift in American attitudes towards the Arab Spring. This has presaged a change in American vision towards its interests in the wider Middle East region and Washington’s relations with both regional powers and global players with influence on the Syrian conflict. Finally, the agreement can be regarded as an expression of American uncertainty, as well as the Obama Administration’s inability to formulate a coherent policy towards Syria two years into the revolution.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This paper offers insights into the Crisis of Liberal International Order by combining Ibn Khaldun's theory of change with scholarship on liberalism and race. We argue that the crisis emerges from the incongruence of two features of liberal order: a binding feature (or 'assabiyya) of white supremacy and liberalism's principles of equality. The crisis is an outcome of a normative political order that can no longer balance a material and discursive reality of racialised hierarchy with ideals of equality. The crisis cannot be reduced to bad leadership or a technical failure to enact liberal values. Instead, attempts to think beyond the crisis must acknowledge the incongruence between white supremacy and liberal equality. Through this diagnosis, we gesture towards the constructive use of "non-Western" theory in the discipline of International Relations.

This paper presents in-depth, eyewitness testimony to the progress of events through the earliest stages of the Syrian revolution, and chronicles how the protests spread. Specifically, it covers the junction when a de-escalation of the protests became difficult, once demands for regime change were solidified on the part of the protestors.

This seminal article is one of the founding texts of Critical Theory in International Relations. In this article, Robert Cox advances a critical alternative to traditional International Relations theory by foregrounding the dialectical relationship between social forces, forms of state, and structures of world order, rather than limiting analysis to interactions among states as isolated units. Cox further distinguishes between problem-solving theory, which takes the existing order as a given and seeks to preserve and improve its functioning, and critical theory, which questions the historical conditions that produced that order, exposes its underlying power relations, and illuminates the possibilities for its transformation. He develops the concept of historical structures as continually evolving configurations composed of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions, and reconceptualizes hegemony as a congruence between power, ideology, and institutions, rather than as the mere material preponderance of a single state.