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Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

The political transition in Syria after the fall of Assad regime faces many interpretations and challenges. This study attempts to identify the situational determinants that form the general framework of the political transition map, especially since any transition process is linked to the determinants of the Syrian revolutionary situation. While most theories of political transition focus on democratization, the study assumes that the political transition in Syria requires an in-depth treatment of the issues that characterize the relationship between the three elements that make up the political sphere: state, political system and society. With help of some of Wolfgang Merkel’s theoretical ideas, the study develops a model of interactive political construction that supports the production of a collective political culture by looking at politics as a concept and as a practice. Through a critical analysis of some aspects of politics under Assad regime, the study concludes that political transition requires reforming the socio-political system by reforming the relationship between the state, power and society in order to build a new political space based on continuous interaction between them.

Multiple International Relations theories brand the international system as anarchist. What is meant by anarchy here is the absence of a central authority at international level to settle conflicts between actors in the international system. This is why states always seek to attain more power, but to do so they cannot adopt idealist policies in the global arena. This theory applies to the way international powers dealt with the Arab revolutions in 2011. International interests in some cases played a key role in the revolutions' development and outcomes. This study characterizes the nature of the international system on the eve of the Arab revolutions and analyzes the degree to which these revolutions interacted with the international system and their outcomes based on the characterization it infers.

Cyber-attacks are considered a new battlefield to be added to the list of conventional threats facing the world. This paper analyzes this growing phenomenon of internet cyber-attacks and sheds more light on the virtual world. The dimensions and effects of this threat transcend political and geographic borders, and its repercussions jeopardize states’ national security and biosecurity. The study exposes issues and consequences of hacking and cracking operations initiated by internet pirates or hackers and “anonymous” groups. The study also touches on the reach of this virtual world that has overcome distances and that should be taken as a guiding light to better address the new threats of this phenomenon on real life.

Aggression is the door that lets in all other forms of crime. Therefore, it is necessary to criminalize it rather than just ban it. Although it was difficult to realize that these two goals are separately essential, they were ultimately reached through the 1945 UN Charter that banned the use of force in international relations and the 1998 Rome Statute that stated the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the practice of this jurisdiction was put on hold until 2010, pending the holding of the review conference that would define aggression and the conditions of the court’s practice of its jurisdiction in this crime in compliance with the UN Charter. This alignment between the UN Charter and the amendment seems logical at first as long as it halts war. The Security Council gets to decide whether the committed act was an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security. But, the question is the following: Did the amendment of the Rome Statute complement the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC in the field of aggression or did it entrench the council’s dominance over the court?

This report reviews Algerian public confidence in the army based on the results of the Arab Opinion Index from 2011- 2019/2020 and places the respondents’ opinions in their historical context, which roughly spans the second half of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s rule and the rise of the Hirak popular movement in February 2019. It concludes that the army still enjoys the confidence of the majority of respondents, and that levels of confidence are governed by the societal perception of a role played by the army in the transition process, in addition to the absence of repression. Comparing trust in the army with other institutions, the report reveals that respondents express a lack of confidence in political parties, elected institutions, and the government in contrast to high confidence in the judiciary.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World March 1th - April 30 th, 2021.

This paper examines those Arab Spring states in which political Islamists are actively engaged. Specifically, it looks at the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, in which political Islamists were involved in regime change, as well as Morocco and Jordan, which did not experience regime change but in which Islamists were actively engaged in the political process and a protest movement. Following an examination of the individual circumstances which prevail in each of these states, the author asserts that there remains a number of pressing questions related to the future roles of political Islamists that merit attention. The first question surrounds the political and ideological project that the Islamists want to promote: will Islamists be capable of shedding their ideological burden, and forwarding a novel political program? This paper demonstrates the limitations of the long-standing ideological promulgations of the Islamists, especially as it pertains to questions of the nation-state, democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and minority rights.