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The study discusses the position of the European Union on Jerusalem and the so-called "Deal of the Century," with US recognition of the city as Israel's undivided capital. In view of the special nature of the European-American relationship, the study tries to clarify the extent to which Europe's existing position regarding the city will remain intact, given reluctance on the part of many international parties to take part in "the Deal," or if Europe now will follow and support America. The classic (and generally sustained) European position that Jerusalem is one of the "permanent status" issues between the Palestinians and the Israelis comes under scrutiny, along with the possibilities of Europe deviating from its stance and politically drifting towards America – giving in to pressures that could arise with implementation of the "the Deal".

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.

العقلاني. ومثاليًا، يتمتع الناس بدرجة معينة من الاختيار فيما يتعلق بالمنطق الذي يريدون استخدامه لتحقيق أهدافهم بأفضل طريقة ولتحقيق مصالحهم". Gero Erdmann & Ulf Engel, "Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch- All Concept," GIGA Working Paper , no. 16 (2006), pp. 18-19. 32 Peter Pawelka, "Der Orientalische Staat im 21. Jahrhundert: Zur Reinkarnation des vormodernen Staates in einer globalisierten Welt," in: Peter Pawelka (ed.), Der Staat im Vorderen Orient: Konstruktion und Legitimation politischer Herrschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 42-38; B rownlee, p p. 35-36 ; Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 110-116. 33 Hazim Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in: Hazim Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London/ New York/ Sydney: Groom Helm, 1987), p. 62; Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics , vol. 53, no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 356-357; Rolf Schwarz, "The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization," Review of International Political Economy , vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 599-600; Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 116-132. 34 Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 123-129.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

This study limits its aim to a discussion of the water policy of Egypt and Ethiopia. It will first lay out the Ethiopian view and the nation's reaction to the escalation of Egyptian media coverage calling for a direct war against Ethiopia after the country's insistence on the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which would disrupt the flow of water to Egypt. With Egypt regularly in control of 85% of the Nile's water, the dam would create a massive change in the water situation in the country. This paper shows the history of the conflict over the water of the Nile between Ethiopia (an Upstream Country) and Egypt (the only Downstream Country) and the position of Ethiopia on old agreements between the parties. The paper presents Ethiopian writings published since the revolution of January 25, 2011 by way of understanding the nation's viewpoint on the issue. ​

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This study aims to deconstruct the Algerian security approach towards the Sahara and Sahel region in Africa which is a concern that currently exemplifies a corne stone in its foreign policy, because of its considerable importance to Algeria’s security, as well as to its national interests. Algeria insists on maintaining an autonomous approach in engineering its security strategy in the region while remaining in cooperation with others. By identifying Algeria’s contribution to security arrangements in Africa, the study provides practical examples that reflect Algeria’s security vision on both: the regional and the continental fronts. This study aims to work as a base for future evaluation of Algeria’s contribution to building African security while preserving autonomy.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.