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This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

​This study explores the concept of a traditional balance of power based on realism, which, for several reasons, is unsuitable to explain the relations between the US and the Gulf States. First, competition between the main regional powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, is not characterized of direct confrontation, but rather manifests through proxy interference in civil war-torn countries (Syria, Yemen, and Iraq). Second, since the greatest threat to the region that has resulted from this competition is an unintended escalation, the final endgame must be collective security and stability, not a balance of power. Third, balance of power in the conventional sense is unrealistic given the actual quantitative and qualitative conventional military superiority of the GCC countries compared to Iran's military capacity.

This paper examines the role of the constitution designing process in pushing the democratic transition towards cooperation, rather than conflict, in light of the great uncertainty that characterizes the democratic transition process regarding the future. The study focuses on four successful cases of democratic transition (Poland, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia) to identify the common factors that contributed to their success. Through its comparative approach, the study concludes that the process of constitution designing more socio-political than legal as it requires a great deal of bargaining and negotiations to achieve balance and harmony between the existing political and social actors. The study shows how the adoption of arrangements that limit the absolute power of the majority (counter- majoritarian measures) was one of the strategies used to assuage any fears and build confidence among the various political actors.

The economic indicators which define inter-Arab economic, political and social diversity, as well as the differences between the Arab countries and their neighbouring countries serve to define the relative economic strengths of each of these countries. This paper adopts a quantitative-statistical approach to arrive at a series of mathematical relationships which serve to fulfil the purpose of this paper. Specifically, the paper seeks to arrive at a ranking of Arab states based on their relative economic power. In doing so, the paper will also seek to determine what the sources of economic strength or weakness for a given country.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

The changing international conditions after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, have creating more challenges to the continuity of the main principle that have governed the Algerian foreign policy “the non-interference principle”. This led to a crisis in the Algerian foreign policy, which appear in the decline of its international role and regional influence. Through discussing the Algerian approach to the Arab Spring, This article proposes that the crisis can be understood in the inability of the Algerian decision -maker to produce an external speech that reconcile between Algerian foreign policy doctrine and its national interests considerations. Such a deficit is what explains the decline of Algeria in dealing with the aftermath of the Arab spring and current international issues in general.

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

Victimization narratives compose a principle element in creating of sub-national identities in societies afflicted by divisions and communal disputes. Little wonder then that narratives of victimization abound in Kirkuk province, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s “disputed internal areas” problem. This paper starts of by analyzing the nature of victimization narratives and how they make use of the past to serve political projects spearheaded by political elites. It then turns to surveying and deconstructing the contending narratives propagated by communal elites in Kirkuk regarding the victimization, whether real or imagined, endured by the province’s demographic components – Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Christians. By analytically surveying the narratives of victimization of these four communities, this paper seeks to ascertain the workings of these narratives and to explicate the role they play.

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.