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ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻣﻨﺬ أواﺧﺮ أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017 أزﻣﺔ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻫﻲ ا ﻛﺜﺮ ﺣﺪةً ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ ﻋﺎم 1981. ﺑﺪأت ا زﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﻤﻠﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴّﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻗﺎدﺗﻬﺎ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ إﻋﻼم ﺳﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وإﻣﺎراﺗﻴﺔ. وﺑﺨﻼف أزﻣﺔ ﺳﺤﺐ اﻟﺴﻔﺮاء ﻋﺎم 2014، أﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﺛﻼث دول ﺧﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، واﻣﺎرات ﻣﻊ ﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 2017، ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﻓﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺛﻢ ﺳﻠ ﻤﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺐ، وأﻣﻬﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻳﺎم ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ أو ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ. وﻓﻲ اﻃﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ، ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪول إﻟﻰ ﻋﺰل ﻗﻄﺮ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴًﺎ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺒﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻀﻮع، ﻏﻴﺮ أنّ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﺑﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﺗﺠﺎه ازﻣﺔ، وﺑﺪأت ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺪور اﻟﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ. ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺬور ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺎراﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺮﺟﺔ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺗﺪاﺧﻞ أدوار ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﻦ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺪوﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ. Since late May 2017, the Gulf region has been witness to the most intense diplomatic crisis since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Tis paper attempts to highlight the roots of the present-day Gulf crisis and explore the potential, complicated outcomes, taking in the roles of various regional and global players. Te crisis begun with a vicious smear campaign against Qatar and led by Saudi- and Emirati-state owned media. In contrast to the 2014 diplomatic rif in which the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were withdrawn from Doha, this latest crisis also included a complete severing of diplomatic ties on the part of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in addition to Egypt.To this was later added a complete blockade of Qatar by air, sea and land. Te countries leading the siege on Doha later presented a ten-point ultimatum to Qatar to fulfill within 10 days. A further attempt by the countries leading the blockade to isolate Qatar on the world stage failed, however, as leading world powers opted to play a more constructive role and mediate an end to the crisis.

This study sheds light on European-Russian relations in the energy field, a complex relationship where the political, economic, and social interact. Russia, today, is a key partner in European security issues, and it is impossible to talk about European security without addressing the Russian role and its effect on the European security system. Russia is also the largest exporter of energy to Europe and its main trading partner. The EU, conversely, is the largest consumer of Russian energy exports, and the EU states have important trade relations with Russia. All this makes European-Russian relations in the energy sphere subject to tension between pressure for cooperation and conflict over interests in the balances of power in the international order.

Results from the Arab Opinion Index indicate that the Arab public is strongly conscientious of the threat posed by Zionism. Since 2011, Israel has continuously been identified by Arab respondents as the single greatest threat to collective Arab security, ahead of both the United States and Iran. The survey data also demonstrate that the Arab peoples are opposed to mutual diplomatic recognition between their countries and Israel, despite the fact that a number of Arab countries have already concluded peace treaties with Israel. When asked to justify their positions, respondents offered explanations which went beyond security concerns, describing Israel as a “colonialist” and “expansionist” state which is racist towards Arabs.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

As the first study to address the very recent issue “secret evidence,” this paper relies on primary and unstudied sources. It reviews the context of recent changes in the European justice system and the impact Hamas has left in filing its petition to have the group lifted from the list of terrorist groups in late 2010. The political dimension in the new law is also considered, including how it was given a legal guise to appear consistent with the requirement of justice. The timid international legal positions and reactions to these developments, the role played by the US and Britain, as well as the mimicry of Israel with regard to the secret evidence law are also discussed. The study concludes by tackling the implications of the new law, and the possibility of Hamas succeeding or failing to have itself removed from the terror list.

Looking at the results of the mid-April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan, the paper reviews the changes that have occurred amid the last presidential cycle under al-Bashir (2010-2015). The election results are analyzed against a background of the South's succession when Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenues and entered a severe economic crisis, and a period when war erupted in the South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states, and unrest continued in the Darfur states. This will also be put into the context of a collapse of Islamist powers in Sudan, the decline of the role of the Islamic movement in the political process, President Bashir's exclusion of Islamist leaders who defected form Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, the rise of generals to power, and their control of the leadership of the Islamic movement itself. Further, the implications of the broad boycott of the elections, the loss of trust in the national electoral commission, and the implication of the growing number of independent candidates are taken into account. Finally, the paper examines Sudan's disengagement with Iran its attempt to return to the Arab fold as a last attempt to buy additional years for the ruling regime.

This article discusses the challenges facing the government of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq, and outlines what ought to be expected in the coming stage, particularly after the fall of Mosul to ISIL. The paper reviews the failure of the regime post 2002 to insure equal participation of all segments of Iraq in the institution of power following the sectarian polices adopted by Nouri al-Maliki who exercised control over all the levers of the political regime and the public political institutions, and systematically harassed other politicians and parties – Sunnis in particular. The paper also reviews the American position, the intervention of the international coalition, and the establishment of the national guard. It looks at the other challenges facing the effort to keep Iraq together and help it emerge from its problems, including the threat of ISIL, sectarian division, the security situation, and the economy. The paper also reviews the regional overlap with the Iraqi situation, particularly the Iranian aspect, and what is transpiring as a new regional equation.

Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.