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This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

Documents of Democratic Transition in the Arab World

How do opinions of gender equality affect perceptions of democracy? Much has been written linking procedural democracy with underlying democratic values; in essence, the argument is that without a general support for democratic values, systems of democratic governance may erode and decline. Democratic values/attitudes are often defined as support for inclusive political and civil freedoms, as well as the institutional safeguards which guarantee them. Opinions towards women's rights can be considered part and parcel of democratic values. Thus, in this paper, we ask whether opinions of gender equality can help predict democratic, or anti-democratic, sentiment. Essentially, we seek to address the question: can one profess a belief in democracy while simultaneously holding misogynistic views and excluding women?

This paper explores the difficulties of the city and governorate of Kirkuk, specifically the problems from its diverse composition. Kirkuk has been described as a “microcosm of Iraq”, in recognition of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity in the region. This gives added impetus to finding a resolution to the difficulties of governance in the governorate-city: a solution to the problems in Kirkuk could have positive reverberations for the rest of Iraq.The governorate’s problems began in the wake of the discovery of oil there, with a gradual effort towards “Arabization” of the population there undertaken by the then-government of Saddam. This led to the formation of clear ethnic fault lines, which became clearer following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that point, Kirkuk became even more polarized, serving to further entrench the problems of governance in the region. Based on the existing literature on Kirkuk, on the Iraqi constitution and the experience of government in Iraq since 2003, this paper proposes consociational democracy as the preferred approach to resolving Kirkuk’s long-outstanding issues, including the disputes resulting from religious and ethnic differences typical of pluralist societies.

Consociationalism is a system of government recommended for ‘divided societies’. Starting with a discussion of its theoretical components and criticisms it has received, this article addresses how consociationalism has been implemented in in post - 2003 Iraq. The article asks whether the Iraqi constitution and institutions formed by it represented a successful case of consociationalism. Key consociational mechanisms such as an electoral system based on proportional representation, governments based on big multi - party coalitions and a federal and decentralized governance were adopted. However, this model was not entirely consociational as some practices that are common in the majoritarian government have also been used. In fact, divisions between majoritarian and consociational perspectives have polarized, and sometimes paralyzed, the political process. In light of this, the article discusses the sustainability of the current model and its likely future trajectories.

Book Title: The Dialogue between Islam and Secularism in Kurdistan: A Study of the Confluence between Islam and Secularism [Arabic]

This paper examines those Arab Spring states in which political Islamists are actively engaged. Specifically, it looks at the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, in which political Islamists were involved in regime change, as well as Morocco and Jordan, which did not experience regime change but in which Islamists were actively engaged in the political process and a protest movement. Following an examination of the individual circumstances which prevail in each of these states, the author asserts that there remains a number of pressing questions related to the future roles of political Islamists that merit attention. The first question surrounds the political and ideological project that the Islamists want to promote: will Islamists be capable of shedding their ideological burden, and forwarding a novel political program? This paper demonstrates the limitations of the long-standing ideological promulgations of the Islamists, especially as it pertains to questions of the nation-state, democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and minority rights.

The Iranian political regime represented by the ruling establishment decided to sign the Geneva Interim Agreement or the Joint Plan of Action in order to renew its legitimacy domestically. The agreement was signed in response to the challenges imposed by geopolitics, especially those related to the repercussions of the Arab Spring, in addition to the Syrian war and its ramifications. In this context, the ruling establishment goes past the Supreme Guide to the president then to the parliament, and past the executive institutions like the Foreign Ministry, the intelligence and the military institution represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The wave of democracy, peaceful or violent, has up till now dispelled many of the illusions prevalent in the West, in Europe especially, including so-called "Arab exceptionalism"—that is the notion that Arabs are not interested in democracy, are indifferent to whether it is present in their lives or not, and are basically not ready for it. A second dismantled illusion is that of the "good dictator" that is based on the claim that dictators loyal to the West are a better bet than the Islamist alternative. A third illusion concerns the idea that the Arab world is itself a construct and that the attractiveness of a supranational Arab identity has gone. The Arab revolutions, however, have proved the above theories wrong. It is not a coincidence that the wave for change broke out in a number of Arab states at the same time and in the same fashion with more or less the same slogans shouted out in the same language, and were able in a very short time to bring down four regimes. The Arab revolutions took academic circles by surprise and made some academics claim that understanding the future of Middle East politics required that academics carry out a serious reassessment of the restored importance of Pan-Arab identity.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.