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Several scholars studying the so-called authoritarian elections argue that the primary motivation for citizens to vote in the Arab world is the pursuit of individual (mostly material) interests driven by clientelism that may take the form of explicit vote-buying or granting services and privileges to electors. However, research overlooked the potential impact of citizens' evaluation of the regime's democratic level on electoral participation. The goal of this study is to fill this gap. The analysis of the eighth round of the Arab Opinion Index (2022) across nine Arab countries—Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania— reveals that individuals who perceive their country as more democratic are more likely to vote, regardless of objective indicators suggesting the undemocratic nature of the political system.

This article aims to explain and review the theoretical and normative contexts of Transitional Justice (TJ). This is done as empirical studies or specific settings particularly in the Arab region need to be rooted much more in TJ theory. The article argues that data and statistics need to be used and evaluated and that there needs to be greater use of methodological processes including empirical studies. It is argued that at present, this is not always the case. Similarly, when models are presented or critiqued by practitioners, little regard is given to TJ theory, or the context within which those models operated. Therefore, it is difficult to see what lessons can be learnt for other places even where the context or circumstances are very similar.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

This study explores the trajectory of state disintegration in Sudan from 1821 to 2025 , starting from a central question: does the April 2023 war constitute a revealing variable that exposes a process of structural disintegration whose foundations accumulated over time? Or is it an explanatory variable that, in itself, drives the deepening of this disintegration? Drawing on a historical sociology approach, the study analyzes the interaction of five main variables addressed in the literature on state disintegration: war, elite conflict, geostrategic intervention, erosion of legitimacy, and the pressures of globalization. The study shows that successive wars and resource depletion, along with ethnic/regional elite divisions and international competition over the Red Sea, have undermined the state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, leading to a hybrid pattern of disintegration in which the center retains international recognition while power is effectively distributed among local armed networks. The study concludes that existing models of state disintegration explain important aspects of the Sudanese experience, but require further development to accommodate forms of multiple sovereignties and managed disintegration.

In 2015, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a massive contentious movement, known as "You Stink", in response to the unfolding of the waste crisis when the main landfill known as "Naameh" was closed. Though other opposition movements preceded it in the post-war period, "You Stink" succeeded in positioning itself as a threat to the continuity in power of the informal pillars of political power- the "politically relevant elites". Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify first those who are influential in framing national political agendas, hence targeted by the movement itself. Second, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key activists within "You Stink", the paper provides an exploratory analysis of the zu'ama's receptivity to it, unpacking the strategies employed to neutralize the movement. It concludes that in addition to obstructive strategies put into play by the zu'ama, certain operative caveats within the movement itself, acted as "political opportunities" to the former's capacity to neutralize and weaken the movement.

The importance of this book derives from the context of ongoing Arabic research on the links between Western and Chinese civilisations, a topic that has gained prominence in the wake of the Arab Spring.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

Brazil is considered a rising power in the world order of the post-Cold War era, and some see it as an emerging middle power. Several motives and caveats drive Brazil’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring revolutions. Brazil decided not to get involved in the affairs of the Arab world and carefully observed the internal developments in Arab countries and the role of some intervening foreign powers. It also reiterated that the West’s military intervention in the affairs of Arab countries is selective and causes more harm than good. Brazil’s reactions varied, as did its stances and ways of addressing the Arab revolutions. The paper explores and analyzes the conflicting Brazilian reactions and assesses the factors behind the different views. It also mentions some expected outcomes of the Brazilian stance and the possible repercussions on Brazil’s international role and economic interests in the Arab region.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.