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Over the past thirty years, important changes have taken place in Israeli attitudes towards the Haram Al Sharif, at both the popular and governmental levels, specifically with regards to the conduct of Jewish prayers at the site and messianic calls for the construction of the “Third Temple”. This paper traces a turning point among both religious and secular Jewish Israelis in the traditional religious view that had long admonished observant Jews from visiting the Haram Al Sharif. The paper highlights the growth of Jewish terrorist groups since the mid-1980s that aim to destroy the existing Muslim holy sites on the Haram Al Sharif, including the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, to make way for the Third Temple. Finally, the paper provides an overview of the changes already made by Israel to the Haram Al Sharif site.

This review covers selected samples of Israeli writings on the Arab Spring produced by think tanks, academic centers, universities in Israel

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

​A one-day academic symposium hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will bring together experts from Russia, the Arab world and the region to examine Moscow’s latest military intervention in Syria, on Saturday, October 24, 2015. While Russia’s decision to intervene directly in the conflict in Syria comes as the culmination of more than four years of diplomatic and military support for the Assad regime, the move by the Kremlin to deploy its military forces has come as a surprise to many observers, becoming a turning point not only in the militarized revolution within Syria, but also in the broader Middle East and indeed in a larger global arena. To better study the circumstances which gave rise to the Russian maneuver and the outcomes likely to result from it, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will convene “Russian Military Intervention in Syria: Motives, Objectives and Repercussions”. In the highly volatile climate which the Middle East is presently witnessing, selected participants at the meeting will be asked to examine the fallout of Russia’s actions on the future stability of the region.

This article discusses the nuclear program agreement reached between the P5+1 group of nations and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article sees the agreement as a historic achievement that may well have major effects in the region. The paper deals with the main features of the agreement and the circumstances that led to it, and enumerates its likely effects on the region and especially on the Palestine-Israel conflict, as well as Israel’s frustration with the Iranian nuclear program and its threats to strike it. The paper puts forth the possibility that the agreement will lead to positive results and cause stability in the region and lead to real improvement in Iranian-Gulf relations, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as resolve the problems of Shia minorities in some Gulf states.

This paper discusses the implications of the Iranian nuclear agreement inside Iran which is experiencing an ongoing battle between moderates and conservatives. It also observes and analyzes the responses within the Gulf states, which is the Arab bloc geographically closest to Iran and the most involved with it and fearful of it. The agreement restrains the Iranian Republic more than it gives it free rein, as it places Iran under international monitoring. The kind of sanctions that can be imposed on Iran in future, if it violates any or all of the provisions of the agreement are a factor controlling Iran’s future course. Alternatively, from what has come to light, it is clear that the marathon negotiations were not limited to the nuclear agreement, as both sides wish to portray. Rather other issues were discussed, including Iran’s future role in the region and the world. The acceleration of action on Syria and Yemen may be a reflection of these other issues.

This paper explores the findings of a general opinion survey conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Findings reveal that the respondents are generally unsatisfied with governmental performance in the economic and social fields as well as in their day-to-day lives. A majority of the respondents also believe that the Israeli government discriminates against its Arab citizens when compared to Jewish Israelis. The vast majority of respondents report perceiving governmental mistreatment of Arab citizens; that the government treated Jewish citizens preferentially; and that they felt that Israeli democracy extended only to Jewish citizens. A majority of Palestinian Israeli citizens responding to the survey also voiced the opinion that the Israeli government had no desire for peace with the Palestinian Authority. Nonetheless, the results also indicate a preference among the respondents for a two-state solution ending the conflict, as opposed to a Bi-national state.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Book Title: Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Run the Country--and Why They Can't Make Peace

​The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies devoted its second Annual Conference for Arab Policy Research Centers to studying the Palestinian cause. “The Palestinian Cause and the Future of the Palestinian National Project” brought together representatives from over 60 research institutes from across the Arab region on December 7-9, 2013.