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Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity [Translated into Arabic]

The referendum on the new Moroccan constitution in July 2011, which varied readings and perspectives around it, between supporters of the methodology and implications brought as necessary step towards democracy.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

Palestine Over Two Months Between Septemper 1, 2018 - October 31, 2018.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

Morocco's participation in the Saudi-led coalition was formed to confront the expansion of Houthi rebel control over the Yemeni state. This study gives an overview of the factors that led to the expansion of the geopolitical and geostrategic depth of the Gulf States to include a number of Arab countries, all the way to the Kingdom of Morocco. The paper discusses the gains Morocco made as a result of joining Operation Decisive Storm. Morocco faces similar challenges from extremist groups, making participation in the operation an opportunity it can benefit from later in the event it needs to tackle similar militias in the Sahara. In addition to the economic and political reasons for joining the coalition, the geostrategic shifts in the Arab region and the rise of the threat of extremist ideological forces in the region has prompted Morocco and the Gulf States to develop a new vision for relations on the basis of cross-border national security. The paper finally tackles the shift Morocco's participation has represented, examining King Mohammed VI's preference for more rapprochement with the European neighborhood.

The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

The presence of the external factor is usually related to the context of the popular hirak, the periods of political transition and the transitional phases in many countries. This factor is evident in countries with a geopolitical position in regional and international competition. This study discusses the variable of the external factor in the 22 February 2019 hirak in Algeria by examining the limits of international and regional interventions in steering the course of the popular hirak compared to other Arab cases where the external factor seemed to be more influential. It aims to discuss the determinants of Algeria's relations with regional and international powers and to explain the issue of the lack of external interference in the popular hirak, ending with the modalities of the future of the turbulent political path and discussing the possibilities of transformation from abroad. The study concludes that the lack of regional and international intervention in the popular hirak is mainly related to geopolitical and strategic constraints, far from value and normative considerations. The behaviour of external forces is determined by Algeria's geopolitical situation. The risks of instability in the country would create highly complex security challenges in the Mediterranean region. Added to this is the importance of Algeria in assessing the strategic balances in the region, especially for European security.

​It was mostly British colonisers who came to consolidate the political, economic and military interests of the motherland and did what they used to do: play football. Apart from spending their time, football worked as a colonial instrument both "civilising" and "disciplining" the colonised populations. The first clubs in North Africa and the Levant restricted membership for non-Westerners and non-whites, but soon football also became a transnational transmitter of independence movements, the stadiums becoming important social spaces on the local and national levels. Such was the emancipatory force of football that it has been preserved across the region ever since the colonial era, prominent again in the Arab Uprisings. However, the massive wealth of the Gulf States and their decision to invest in football's soft power has changed the equation. The article thus describes emancipatory and counter-emancipatory trends in MENA football history from a longue durée perspective.