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Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had held sit-ins outside the Rab’a Adawiya Mosque, on the edge of a Square located in the Nasr City district east of Cairo, before the forced dispersal by Egyptian security forces led to a massacre on August 2. Using aerial footage, Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 protestors were gathered at the square before the massacre. The steps taken to disperse the crowds had totally contradicted assurances by the Egyptian authorities, for example that the process would be gradual; that a security cordon would allow for the safe passage of women and children in particular; and that protestors would have sufficient warning to leave. Clearly, the massacre illustrates that the Egyptian authorities failed miserably in their duty to ensure that any loss of life resulting from the dispersal was kept to a bare minimum. This paper makes use of the evidence documented by Human Rights Watch on the events surrounding the dispersal of the Rab’a Square, concentrating on three main points: the violence of some of the protestors; the high death toll resulting from the dispersal; unjustified killings of protestors; and the lack of any safe exit routes for the protestors.

This paper discusses the relationship between Egypt’s military and security institutions, on the one hand, and the forces of the revolutionary movement since January 25 2011, on the other. It evaluates this relationship by looking at how it evolved during Egypt’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. It achieves this by breaking events down into three main phases: an initial transitional phase managed directly by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); Mohamed Morsi’s presidency; and the revolutionary movement after Morsi’s ouster. Based on observations of the three main junctures, this paper carries out a detailed reading of the major events in each phase and analyzes the impact that each had when it came to shaping the relationship between the military and security institutions. The paper sees distinct characteristics of the relationship between these central institutions at each phase, and assesses the impact of these different moments on the political process in Egypt more generally

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This study provides an analysis of Egypt's political system since 2013 , with a particular focus on President Sisi's efforts to establish and manage a "new republic." It explores the internal factors that influence the structure and nature of the regime and examines the regional and international contexts that shape this endeavor and contribute to its support, despite concerns over authoritarian practices and significant human rights violations. the study aims to elucidate the foundational principles, defining characteristics, and key dimensions of the "new republic." It also evaluates its strengths, prospects for success, functional role, and the reasons for substantial international endorsement of the regime. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which the regime's rhetoric regarding the new republic aligns with practical realities and appraises President Sisi's efficacy in implementing this vision.

Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

This report includes documentation of the most significant milestones in the democratic transition in the Arab world from May 1 to June 30, 2023.

This study explore the concepts of populism and “the people,” linking them to ideology, hegemony, and the making of modern sport in Western liberal-capitalist democracies. While populism is widely seen as a useful way to understand oppositions between “the people” and elites, This study particularly interested here in what happens when self-styled populist political leaders actually govern, ostensibly on the people’s behalf. To illustrate this, the study consider two examples of self-styled populist leaders from different eras – Benito Mussolini and Donald Trump – that have used sport to promote narrow, ideologically laden, conceptions of “the people.” Through these examples the study argue that the concept of populism on its own does not provide a comprehensive understanding of political and cultural struggles in sport today, nor does it provide adequate guidelines for oppositional political strategies.

​This study seeks to measure the digital divide and its impact on political participation in selected Arab countries. It focuses in particular on assessing the role of demographic and socio-economic status (SES) in unequal access to the Internet. A multivariate logistic regression analysis was used to predict political participation based on SES and internet use. Based on Arab Index data, the results of the analysis indicate that SES (gender, age, income and educational level) plays a major role in the level of Internet access, and that the purpose for which the Internet is used determines the likelihood of political participation. The results also indicate that vulnerable social groups are more reluctant to participate in political activities.

The Arab Opinion Index 2019/2020 data on the Algerian Hirak shows the consolidation of the phenomenon of taking to the streets to protest as the dominant form of expression of political, economic, and social demands at a time when forms of institutional political participation, such as party and trade union membership, are declining. The Index results confirmed that tyranny, monopolisation of power and corruption are the main factors that led people to protest and gave the movement the great dynamism that characterises it. Although the Algerian street movement succeeded in forcing Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former President of Algeria, to resign, preventing him from running for a fifth term as president and raising hopes for an improvement in economic and social indicators, these hopes quickly faded after the conviction grew that the regime had not changed and that the general situation remained as it was before.

The presence of the external factor is usually related to the context of the popular hirak, the periods of political transition and the transitional phases in many countries. This factor is evident in countries with a geopolitical position in regional and international competition. This study discusses the variable of the external factor in the 22 February 2019 hirak in Algeria by examining the limits of international and regional interventions in steering the course of the popular hirak compared to other Arab cases where the external factor seemed to be more influential. It aims to discuss the determinants of Algeria's relations with regional and international powers and to explain the issue of the lack of external interference in the popular hirak, ending with the modalities of the future of the turbulent political path and discussing the possibilities of transformation from abroad. The study concludes that the lack of regional and international intervention in the popular hirak is mainly related to geopolitical and strategic constraints, far from value and normative considerations. The behaviour of external forces is determined by Algeria's geopolitical situation. The risks of instability in the country would create highly complex security challenges in the Mediterranean region. Added to this is the importance of Algeria in assessing the strategic balances in the region, especially for European security.