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Although women have been present in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since its inception, their status in the organization and political role has been restricted by Brotherhood thinking that promotes a division of roles in society on the basis of biological difference, and that emphasizes the primary role for women being in the private sphere and their central function being in the family. During the short period of democratic opening up that followed the January 25 revolution, the political participation of Brotherhood women increased. Following the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, women went beyond the frameworks and roles assigned to them. They took to the streets and for the first time in the history of the Brotherhood were at the forefront of the movement of protest and opposition against the political regime. In spite of these visible developments, this paper holds that these shifts derived from the absence of Brotherhood men, and does not reflect a shift in the ideology. For these development to have an impact on the power relations between men and women in the movement, and to lead to the political and organizational empowerment of women, there should be a fundamental change in the movement’s vision of women in general.

This paper presents an overview of trends in public opinion in four Arab countries—Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (covering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) towards events in the Syrian crisis. The data presented in this paper draws on opinion polls, comprising of face-to-face interviews with representative samples within each of the countries named above, and conducted as part of the 2012 Arab Opinion Index. The results of the survey demonstrate that there is no sharp divide in public attitudes towards the Syrian crisis, with firm majorities across all countries believing that an ideal solution to the Syrian crisis lies in the overthrow of the current regime. Only 8% of respondents held the view that the best solution to the crisis in Syria would lie in the total vanquishing of the opposition.

​The 20 February movement was formed out of a defining moment in modern Moroccan political history, and forced the ruling regime to undertake a process to reform and give up some of its powers. This study takes a look at the path of the 20 February movement as it took shape in 2011. It looks at the defining role played by the group in the Arab Spring protests. It analyzes the components of the movement and the stages of its development and decline in addition to presenting factors that explain the potentials and setbacks it faced months after its beginning. These are related to the existing political and social opportunities in Morocco, in particular the nature of its political system, the position of main actors, as well as the regional and international atmosphere. The social framing of the movement and the limits of its ability to instigate a wide social movement among the poor and vulnerable social classes is also considered, as well as how the movement went about promoting its ideas, apart from the difficulties related to creating a common identity that can unite its contradicting components.

​The Contemporary Syrian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a two-day workshop on November 17 and 18, 2013 during which a group of distinguished Syrian academics, statesmen and political activists discussed a proposed plan for the democratization of Syria which was published earlier in 2013 by the Syrian Expertise Bureau in coordination with the Syrian Studies Center.

The Iranian political regime represented by the ruling establishment decided to sign the Geneva Interim Agreement or the Joint Plan of Action in order to renew its legitimacy domestically. The agreement was signed in response to the challenges imposed by geopolitics, especially those related to the repercussions of the Arab Spring, in addition to the Syrian war and its ramifications. In this context, the ruling establishment goes past the Supreme Guide to the president then to the parliament, and past the executive institutions like the Foreign Ministry, the intelligence and the military institution represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Egypt’s soft power is one of the strongest cards and tools of Egyptian power in the region. This study aims at highlighting the ebb and flow of Egypt’s soft power since the end of World War II, if not before. It explores its sources and forms, how it was employed to fulfill national and nationalistic interests as well as the factors and reasons that led to its decline in the Arab world and the region. The study also focuses on the repercussions of this decline on Egypt’s future power and its situation. The study states several factors or variables that must be taken into account to revive Egypt’s soft power which must include political reform, building a democratic state and reshaping and rehabilitating Egypt’s human resources and developing their skills. The study states that the most needed factor to reignite Egypt’s soft power revolves around giving Egypt’s political regime its legitimacy and appeal back.

This study provides a reading of the implications and significance of the most recent Iranian presidential election results in light of the available numerical data. It analyses the cultural, political, and economic factors that shaped Iranian mentality within both opposition and loyalist circles. The study discusses the challenges facing the new president, Hassan Rouhani, and examines part of the political struggle over the concept of “moderation” chosen by Rouhani as a motto for his term in office. The study finds that the election results confirm the Iranian political arena’s continued reliance on the old approach in the management of its conflicts. It expects the debate over moderation to be settled in practical terms through the new government’s political performance. Settling this debate will have a huge impact on Rouhani’s relationship with Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and influential forces in the regime, on one hand, and with loyalist and opposition political currents on the other. As such, the practical answer to the question of “moderation” will remain the determining factor for the course and outcome of Rouhani’s presidential experiment.

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?

​The political game in Morocco has set rules and the royal institution plays a central role in its use of an approach that seeks to maintain the main political balance through soft guidance. The royal institution employs several strategies ranging from progressive integration to the implementation of restrictions, policies of repression, and use of torture as well as ignoring, feigning indifference, and taking a variety of other positions that skirt direct interference, which would cause the regime to appear authoritarian. This approach often leads to resolving outstanding problems instead of implementing threats. The paper argues that the political formula has enabled the Justice and Development Party to engage in the political arena on a practical level. The Islamists’ daily dealings with a complex reality, with all its problems and complications, have forced them to look for solutions with political officials either through consensus and coordination or by presenting their concerns to the parliament as an opposition party. This contributed a great deal to maturing and developing the party’s political experience despite the challenges posed by the parameters of the political game and the narrow margins it leaves for maneuvering.