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With the expansion of donor entities and the growth of their various activities, the questions about foreign aid and the strategic objectives behind it have become essential. This paper asks the following questions: Why do donor entities provide aid to poor countries? What are the most important objectives of these donors? Are humanitarian motives the main factor determining the conduct of donors? Theoretical and empirical studies have addressed these questions in depth from various theoretical backgrounds looking at many areas of the world, but there remains no agreement regarding the most important motives and objectives governing the conduct of donor countries in providing aid to poor countries. This paper seeks to answer these questions by reviewing, analyzing, and adapting the most important studies in international development and international relations to highlight the most important features of the global debate on this issue.

ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒُﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ا دوار اﻟﺘﻲ اﺿﻄﻠﻌﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ اﺟﺘﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ رﻳﺎح اﻟﺜﻮرات؛ إذ ﻧﻠﺤَﻆ أن اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺮ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺻﻄﻔﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻘﻮات ﻧﺠﺤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﻮغ ﻣﺮادﻫﺎ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻊ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺪﻋﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﺼﻤﻮد ﻓﻲ وﺟﻪ ﻗﻤﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴﺔ. إن ا دوار اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺧﺬت اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺆدﻳﻬﺎ اﻟﻴﻮم ﻻ ﺗﺆﻛﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﻴﻮش وأﻫﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ وﺣﺴْ ﺐ، وﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﺚ أﻳﻀ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺻﻼح اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان. وﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﺳﺆال إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ واﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻳﺒﺮز ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎوﺑًﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ. وﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻃﺎر، ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻣﻨﻲ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. This paper explores the military aspect of the Arab Spring, and specifically the role played by formal armies in the Arab Spring states. Specifically, this paper focuses on the fact that popular revolutions during the Arab Spring were successful in those countries in which the military sided with the protestors, whereas revolutionary momentum could not face down the regimes in those countries where the armies did not side with the revolution. The political functions which Arab armies carry out serve to highlight not only their significance and effectiveness as institutions, but also the need for military reform. The question of military and security sector reform has become increasingly pressing in the post-Arab Spring transitional phase, driving the author to probe the structural aspects of reform to the military and security sectors of the Arab Spring states.

It is difficult to imagine an influential presence for Salafism in Turkey despite the talk of the "spread" of Salafism there. This must be accompanied by methodological questions that articulate the challenges related to the intellectual environment of the Turkish society. It also relates to the historical context and political competition amongst the Sunni community. One question is "How could Salafism have such a powerful presence in a Sufi society, whose empire had adopted the 'opinion approach' of Abu Hanifa and Maturidi and whose modern republic had adopted the philosophy of the West and secularism?" Both are contrary to the Salafi approach based on tradition and the literal commitment to the texts of the Quran, Hadith and the sayings of 'al-Salaf a-Saleh'. Another question is "How can Salafism overcome the historical and psychological barrier in Turkey that formed as a result of Ottoman-Saudi disputes at the beginning of the nineteenth century and whose intellectual effects have continued until a recent time?"

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

This study builds on the assumption that any change in the structure of the international system in the foreseeable future cannot be immediately ascribed to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, even if the pandemic is purely incidental and unable to change the existing distribution of power, this does not mean it has not introduced a dialogue within International Relations on the impact of epidemics on the structure of the international system, and their ability to intensify some essential - economic, social, and political - factors that contribute to international system change. International power balances before the outbreak of the pandemic indicate the beginning of change of the international system, as if it has been moving towards multipolarity, particularly with many rising powers, such as China, Russia and the European Union, whose international interests challenge those of the US, especially as the latter persistently impedes any rise of rival powers in the foreseeable future.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.

This study investigates the causes beneath the absence of non-Western theorizing efforts in the field of International Relations (IR), aiming to shed light on intellectually and politically defectiveness of the Arab World in the field, as manifested since the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. To this end, the study discusses the position of the Arab World in IR and illustrates how the North (the Centre) deliberately ignores knowledge production on international relations from the South (the Periphery) through abstraction, reductionism, and exclusion. Finally, the study scrutinizes how the situation in the Arab World reflects the continuation of colonialism in two evident forms: epistemologically through the knowledge-power nexus; and by subjugation or keeping states, even those that are nominally independent, subservient to the Great Powers in international politics.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.