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It is difficult to imagine an influential presence for Salafism in Turkey despite the talk of the "spread" of Salafism there. This must be accompanied by methodological questions that articulate the challenges related to the intellectual environment of the Turkish society. It also relates to the historical context and political competition amongst the Sunni community. One question is "How could Salafism have such a powerful presence in a Sufi society, whose empire had adopted the 'opinion approach' of Abu Hanifa and Maturidi and whose modern republic had adopted the philosophy of the West and secularism?" Both are contrary to the Salafi approach based on tradition and the literal commitment to the texts of the Quran, Hadith and the sayings of 'al-Salaf a-Saleh'. Another question is "How can Salafism overcome the historical and psychological barrier in Turkey that formed as a result of Ottoman-Saudi disputes at the beginning of the nineteenth century and whose intellectual effects have continued until a recent time?"

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

The occupied West Bank has experienced a steady expansion of settlement construction and settler demographic presence since 1967. This study analyzes the strategies of settler colonialism in the West Bank using interactive maps produced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It argues that settler colonialism operates as an ongoing structure rather than a discrete event, relying on evolving forms of the logic of elimination and the spatial and demographic reconfiguration of Palestinian society. The study highlights the central role of the Israeli Civil Administration and state institutions in regulating the indigenous population in ways that facilitate settlement expansion. It demonstrates a shift from direct exclusion to more complex mechanisms of domination based on population management and bureaucratic control. The findings identify two core strategies: consolidating control over the Jordan Valley and land behind the separation barrier, and tightening control over the heart of the West Bank through three settlement belts surrounding Jerusalem.

This study examines the impact of post-truth discourse during the 2019 Sudanese Revolution and the subsequent transitional period, as well as the role played by social media platforms in promoting this discourse and mobilizing broad segments of the population behind it. The study also explores the susceptibility of social media users to follow false news in contrast to their engagement with factual reporting. It argues that the Sudanese Revolution and the transitional phase (2019 – 2023) coincided with the emergence of a new media landscape rooted in a politically and socially divided environment, characterized by diverse perspectives and the growing influence of social media. These platforms played positive roles in the dynamics of the revolution, significantly contributing to the mobilization of large popular groups to participate in demonstrations and sit-ins that ultimately led to the regime's overthrow. However, they also generated confusion and uncertainty among these groups due to the rise of post-truth discourse fueled by fake news, which in turn intensified polarization among revolutionary youth and activists.

This section examines the most significant political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we feature two documents from Yemen and Egypt, covering the period from September 1 to October 31, 2024.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

This article explains underlying drivers of the general contours of Chinese foreign policy. Since the Cold War, China has increasingly been playing the role of a major power but demonstrates hesitancy in some theatres and has not developed its full capacities to that end. This article attends to the study of “Strategic Culture”, a framework which helps explain ideas generated from the history, culture, and societal narratives of a state, and which place general parameters that indicate preferred foreign policy options. Strategic Culture does not cause action, but helps define potential acceptable options. It is complementary to other explanations around the importance of factors such as distribution of material capabilities, decision maker’s idiosyncrasies, and alliance commitments. In particular, strategic culture helps understand long-term foreign policy patterns.

Aggression is the door that lets in all other forms of crime. Therefore, it is necessary to criminalize it rather than just ban it. Although it was difficult to realize that these two goals are separately essential, they were ultimately reached through the 1945 UN Charter that banned the use of force in international relations and the 1998 Rome Statute that stated the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the practice of this jurisdiction was put on hold until 2010, pending the holding of the review conference that would define aggression and the conditions of the court’s practice of its jurisdiction in this crime in compliance with the UN Charter. This alignment between the UN Charter and the amendment seems logical at first as long as it halts war. The Security Council gets to decide whether the committed act was an act of aggression and a threat to international peace and security. But, the question is the following: Did the amendment of the Rome Statute complement the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC in the field of aggression or did it entrench the council’s dominance over the court?

Iran, over the past four decades, lived through a state of continuous alert to defend itself against the threats surrounding it and targeting its national security. Over that period, Iran did not enjoy clear recognition of its legitimacy from the major powers, the United States in particular. This created ongoing anxiety and restricted Iran’s efforts of “preserving the regime”, which Ayatollah Khomeini made the highest duty. These circumstances had tangible effects on Iranian national security and its strategy. The article sees that the nuclear agreement might be the beginning of a new phase. Via the agreement, Iran feels it has gained the recognition of the international community, and acknowledgement of its demand for legitimacy. Most importantly for Iran, the agreement shifts it away from the obsession with security and stability, and encourages it to bring out the features of the “Iranian model” in the region. The paper also discusses the fears of neighboring states and Iran’s efforts to reassure them. The positions of the political currents and the power centers in Iran are also considered as well as their differences over the pluses and minuses of the agreement.