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​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

Revolution is coupled with the state, and thinking about the former is linked to investigating the other, whether in history or political theory. Therefore, the Arab revolutions, as they were overthrowing the authoritarian regimes, had to evoke ideas about the state. This evocation would necessarily lead to an interrogation of the reality of the “nation state” and its future. The problematic dealt with directly in this paper, therefore, is whether the nation state was a subject for the revolution or a framework for it? On this analytical horizon a great many ironies and questions become apparent: is the revolution a sign of the decline of the national state and a decisive closure to a whole period when the state declared the impossibility of modernization and democracy? Or is it a late consolidation of the legitimacy of the nation state as the institutional expression of a national group, with the event of the revolution forming the pinnacle of its coalescence as a political nation? Does the idea of the nation state require burying once and for all, or does it need reconstruction? Was the Arab Spring a revolt against nationalism(s) or was it their maturation and the culmination of their consolidation?

​​​This study examines virtual public reactions on X regarding BRICS expansion to include three Arab countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It uses a deep learning approach for sentiment analysis to understand reactions expressed by individuals in the 22 Arab League countries. The study aims to understand public opinion towards this expansion and assess how it was received at the bottom-internal level. Given the difficulty of measuring public opinion in non-democratic contexts, the study tracks public reaction to the expansion on X. Tweets from August 24, 2023, to January 7, 2024, are analyzed. The methodology involves collecting a large dataset of tweets, cleansing and tokenizing the data, and attributing sentiment scores using specialized Arabic text-processing tools. The results are presented through data visualization and machine learning models, ensuring a comprehensive analysis while addressing ethical considerations. The findings indicate that public sentiment is predominantly neutral (38.91%), compared to positive (31.72%) and negative (30.09%). This highlight concerns about education, political disengagement, and the technical limitations of applying a data science approach to political science research. It also suggests the inherent challenges of using this method to reflect internalization or engagement in the way surveys and referenda can.​

​This paper tackles the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry over the position of central state in North Africa and explores the stages of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. According to the author, the rivalry between these two Arab neighbors over the position of “unitary state” is the main factor behind the tense relations between the two states, tension that inevitably affects the action plan of the Arab Maghreb Union. The relative balance of power between Algeria and Morocco explains why the conflict is centralized between them rather than other states of the Arab Maghreb. Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania are well aware that they do not have the qualifications to occupy the position of “unitary state”.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.

The paper studies the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, from a geopolitical perspective. It argues that this conflict has historical and political roots, not solely tied to the natural availability of water in the Tigris and Euphrates, but rather connected to the policies of different parties in managing water resources. The paper includes three essential elements. The first examines the geographical and hydrological characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates. The second explores the political and academic discourse in the 1990s regarding the "water war" theory. The third and final element analysed the characteristics of the new conditions that have distinguished the three countries since the beginning of this century, imposing on Syria and Iraq the need to devise a new vision for managing their available water resources. The research concludes with the inevitability of negotiation for the joint management of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources as it is not in Turkey's interest to ignore the interests of downstream countries. Moreover, Syria and Iraq cannot achieve any results without negotiation and water diplomacy.

This paper analyses of some of the most salient Israeli laws and legal instruments used to entrench control over Jerusalem and alter the city spatially and demographically. The first of three sections examines the Israeli legal instruments used, since the 1948 occupation of western districts of the city, to control Jerusalem. The second section explores the repercussions of US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. The same section also examines the enshrinement of "Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel" law of 1980, amendments to which require an overwhelming majority of Knesset members. The third and final section explores the avenues potentially available to the Palestinians in confronting Israeli plans for the re-settling of Jerusalem, a task which requires the formulation of a clear, multi-faceted strategy implemented by both grassroots and official Palestinians.

عنوان الكتاب في لغته: The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations : Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers. عنوان الكتاب: النّضال من أجل الاعتراف في العلاقات الدولية: القوى الراهنة والتعديلية والصاعدة. المؤلّف: ميشيل موراي. سنة النشر: 2019. النّاشر: Oxford University Press. عدد الصفحات: 280 صفحة.