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​The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies devoted its second Annual Conference for Arab Policy Research Centers to studying the Palestinian cause. “The Palestinian Cause and the Future of the Palestinian National Project” brought together representatives from over 60 research institutes from across the Arab region on December 7-9, 2013.

For months, the transitional phase in Tunisia underwent a critical historical period that almost foiled efforts to establish a newly-born democratic state and undermined the foundational work of the post-revolution state. In fact, the increasing violence, the high living cost, the raging conflict over power, the intermittent rise of partisan, ideological and religious tensions, the return of the old regime media, the emergence of the harbingers of a counter-revolution and the decrease in Tunisia’s sovereign ranking showed followers of the situation that the Arab Spring in its first cradle was at risk. Citizens felt afraid, and they longed for stability and reassurance. The deteriorating political situation based on polarization and dispute between the ruling troika and the opposition added insult to injury. The paper sheds light on the situation of the prominent influential political parties in Tunisia and on the complexities of the political crisis. It also explores the prospects of the upcoming phase.

Book Title: Egypt and its Islamists After the January 25 Revolution [Arabic]

Book Title: The Hashemite Arab Federation in British Documents: The Complete Official British Archive on the Hashemite Federation between Iraq and Jordan 1958 [Arabic]

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.

​Book Title: The Secession of South Sudan: Risks and Opportunities [Arabic]Author: Multiple

This paper seeks to ascertain the extent of positive Arab public attitudes—or lack thereof—towards the Arab popular revolutions, after more than a year since the revolutions first broke out. The results show an overall positive attitude towards the Arab revolutions among the Arab public. When asked to provide reasons for their positive disposition towards the revolutions, respondents spoke of an "Arab Awakening" which laid the foundations for democratic governance in the Arab region by restoring the democratic rights of Arab citizens. Opposition to the Arab revolutions and their impacts accounted for only 25% of Arab public opinion. A majority of respondents who disapproved of the Arab revolutions blamed the failure of these popular movements to achieve their aims, as well as the resulting economic and political instability. In addition to broad overall support for the Arab revolutions, the Arab public credits the recent revolutions with improved treatment of the public by the police and other government officials in the Arab region.

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is a policy formulated in the 1960s, and one that Israel has consistently applied until today. The paper examines the roots of this policy and the internal and external factors that contributed to its formulation. In this context it follows the influence of the United States by illustrating the development of contacts and negotiations between the US and Israel concerning the Israeli nuclear program, and the understandings between the two states during the 1960s, culminating in the agreement between Golda Meir and Nixon in 1969 over Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. The study also follows the debates and discussions between Israeli academics and experts over this policy since the 1980s. Finally, the paper also reviews Israel’s preparation for a second strike and analyzes the aims of Israel’s nuclear policy.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.