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​For centuries, Arabs and Kurds have shared not only the same geographical space, but also the same cultural sphere. Even during periods of heighten awareness of their ethnic differences, it would have been impossible to speak of anything approaching a “Kurdish Question” within the Arab world prior the twentieth century and the advent—and global spread—of the nation-state model born in the 19th century, which, in its Middle Eastern variant, was always rooted in ethnicity. This was complicated by the need of the emergent nation-states to absorb and integrate nascent political identities born of these ethnic groups.

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples. The overall samples guarantee probability-proportional-to-size (PPS), ensuring fairness in the representation of various population segments. With an aggregate sample size of 18,310 respondents (50% of whom were men and 50% women). The Arab Opinion Index remains the largest public opinion survey covering the Middle East and North Africa. The fieldwork was carried out by an overall team of 840 individuals (half of whom were women), who conducted 45,000 hours of face-to-face interviews, covering a total of 760,000 kilometers across the population clusters sampled.

This paper discusses the findings of a special opinion survey undertaken by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies on Arab attitudes towards the November, 2016 presidential election in the United States. American domestic politics and its impact on the Arab region have increased significantly in the new millennium, with the US invading and occupying Iraq in 2003, and becoming involved in the internationalization of conflicts in Yemen, Libya and Syria. The results presented here examine Arab public expectations of American foreign policy towards these issues and more following the 2016 elections.

Forced migration from Iraq and Syria today are reminiscent of the Palestinian Nakba of the late 1940s, underscoring the need for a revision of Arab knowledge in the field of forced migration. This paper attempts to offer a starting point for researchers interested in the subject, and attempts to expand the specifically Sudanese experience across the Arab world. The paper also takes in those academic studies which explore the violent aspects of forced migration as well as the extent to which Sudanese government policy on refugees is tied to the social values of the Sudanese people. One conclusion made in this regard is the possibility that the integration of refugees can be used to address structural instabilities in Arab societies. The author highlights the importance of the interested parties—including governments, grassroots movements and returned refugees—to cooperate in effecting the integration of refugees who return to their home countries, a challenge more complicated than hosting refugees abroad.

Examined in this article are a number of aspects of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, specifically, the relationship between the presidency and the parliament; the status of the newly created constitutional court; the higher judicial council; constitutional controls and restrictions; the role of religion and the status of women in the new constitution; and administrative decentralization within the constitution. Adopting a comparative approach, the author examines each of these topics in their proper regional and historical context. This allows for a clearer understanding of what factors have allowed Tunisia's constitutional politics to advance so quickly when compared to other states in the region. Through successful dialogue, the Tunisian people were able to prove that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to conflict or stagnation. The author further argues that the pragmatic approach of Tunisian parties to the national dialogue provided a model of conflict resolution to be emulated across the globe.

This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

This paper seeks to understand Arab public attitudes towards Turkey. The author goes beyond Arab perceptions of Turkey’s regional policies, taking in the general Arab perception of the Turkish people, and the evaluation of Turkey’s democracy and political advancement among Arab respondents. The author reports that one-third of the Egyptian public has a broadly positive view of Turkish society and of Turkish policies. The results also suggest that divisions in Arab attitudes towards specific issues, such as the conflicts in Iraq and in Syria and the Sunni-Shia divide, contribute to a similarly fractured Arab attitude towards Turkey across the wider region. Most Arab respondents voiced the view that Turkey treats the Arab peoples with dignity and respect, while acknowledging that Ankara used its regional policies to advance its own interests.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

Book Title: The Kurds, Language and Politics: A Study in Linguistic Structures and Identity Policies [Arabic]