Latest Articles

This study explores protest dynamics in Morocco following the "Arab Spring", examining the Rif uprisings within their local, national, and regional context, and assessing the various socio-political, economic, historical, and cultural drivers behind the protests. The research draws on the political, constitutional and legal shortcomings that render street protest the preferred political action against the negative impact of public policies. Despite government violations, these protests have remained peaceful, maintained a youthful character and popularity. These movements have continued to expand, innovate, and communicate, while maintaining diversity in organization and expression. The combination of radicalism and flexibility, and the fusion of its local character with its national and international dimensions. All of these characteristics indicate the developments in protest behaviour, with a new generation adding new experiences.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

In September 2018 it will have been thirteen years since the referendum on the reconciliation plan in Algeria. This paper considers the details and achievements of the plan by investigation of the concept and objectives of national reconciliation and the historical framework of the Algerian crisis, critiquing the plan in order to establish new horizons for reconciliation. It examines the historical context of Algeria's national reconciliation, and then the chronology of the path to national reconciliation. It then moves on to study the Algerian journey of reconciliation through a thorough reading of the draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Finally, the paper determines the extent of the advances made in establishing peace and coexistence in the Algerian homeland and also identifies some of the gaps in the reconciliation experience, and suggests ways to unlock potential achievements.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

This paper presents an overview of trends in public opinion in four Arab countries—Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (covering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) towards events in the Syrian crisis. The data presented in this paper draws on opinion polls, comprising of face-to-face interviews with representative samples within each of the countries named above, and conducted as part of the 2012 Arab Opinion Index. The results of the survey demonstrate that there is no sharp divide in public attitudes towards the Syrian crisis, with firm majorities across all countries believing that an ideal solution to the Syrian crisis lies in the overthrow of the current regime. Only 8% of respondents held the view that the best solution to the crisis in Syria would lie in the total vanquishing of the opposition.

This study argues that the political system resulting from the post-2003 political process in Iraq contributed to the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a homogeneous political identity, without taking into account the multiplicity of ideological orientations within the minorities themselves. These minorities have become political minorities, but they are powerless and unable to change or influence the political decision-making process in Iraq. This means that political practice in Iraq, including general electoral practice, remained a practice based on the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, and did not turn into a real political practice. In other words, the identity marker (sect, ethnicity, etc.) comes before the political manifesto. This political reality imposed on ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities a political behaviour represented in voting for their ethnic, religious and linguistic parties, just as they were in the one-party era.

​Events in Mosul, which was captured by ISIL on June 9, 2014, cannot be viewed in isolation from the severe political crisis afflicting the post 2003 Iraqi political regime. Generally speaking, radical groups cannot be separated from the political environment that fostered them. They are the product of a structurally imbalanced political situation. The growth of such groups in Iraq, from Al Qaeda to ISIL, provides a textbook lesson of this. They are the expression of an imbalance political situation, even if they develop and assume an independence from the political context that gave birth to them. They grow, develop, and draw oxygen from these imbalances and from sharp political and social divisions. Hence, it is not possible to defend the idea that these groups have autonomous power, rather their power derives from the acceptance of their social incubator in a political context that this incubator allows to play a role in correcting the balances of power, as a tool or revenge, pressure, influence, or the like.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly

Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.