Latest Articles

The dominant-party system as theorized by political literature is examined through the case of Israel. At first glance, the 2015 elections in Israel reinforce the view that the country is in transformation to a dominant party system, rather than a stage where a dominant party governs it. This confirms the theoretical political literature, which also makes this distinction. The paper argues that the current stage may be a prelude to the dominant-party stage, especially if Israeli policies continue down their current path. The path in question undermines the democratic foundations of the Israeli political system, cementing right-wing discourse as the dominant position in both state and the public sphere. This trend is likely to continue so long as opposing camps remain entrenched. Regional and international climates reinforce the right's discourse; which Netanyahu has strengthened during his years in power. If his successful policy of managing the conflict with the Palestinians without reaching a solution or paying a price continues, this trend will become further entrenched. In four sections, this paper overviews the theoretical debate regarding the notion of the dominant-party system, analyses the results of the general election in Israel, then presents a sociological analysis of the election results. It concludes with a discussion of the results in the context of the concept of the dominant-party system.

Looking at the results of the mid-April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan, the paper reviews the changes that have occurred amid the last presidential cycle under al-Bashir (2010-2015). The election results are analyzed against a background of the South's succession when Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenues and entered a severe economic crisis, and a period when war erupted in the South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states, and unrest continued in the Darfur states. This will also be put into the context of a collapse of Islamist powers in Sudan, the decline of the role of the Islamic movement in the political process, President Bashir's exclusion of Islamist leaders who defected form Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, the rise of generals to power, and their control of the leadership of the Islamic movement itself. Further, the implications of the broad boycott of the elections, the loss of trust in the national electoral commission, and the implication of the growing number of independent candidates are taken into account. Finally, the paper examines Sudan's disengagement with Iran its attempt to return to the Arab fold as a last attempt to buy additional years for the ruling regime.

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

Brazil is considered a rising power in the world order of the post-Cold War era, and some see it as an emerging middle power. Several motives and caveats drive Brazil’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring revolutions. Brazil decided not to get involved in the affairs of the Arab world and carefully observed the internal developments in Arab countries and the role of some intervening foreign powers. It also reiterated that the West’s military intervention in the affairs of Arab countries is selective and causes more harm than good. Brazil’s reactions varied, as did its stances and ways of addressing the Arab revolutions. The paper explores and analyzes the conflicting Brazilian reactions and assesses the factors behind the different views. It also mentions some expected outcomes of the Brazilian stance and the possible repercussions on Brazil’s international role and economic interests in the Arab region.

Beginning with a review of existing theories of international relations that discuss policies of penetration, this study examines current politics of the Arab regional order. Four different aspects of penetration are reviewed, including intra-Arab threats, rivalry between Arab states to occupy a central position, historical legacy, and multinational companies. The role of Arab elites in processes of penetration by means of their links with international powers and interests is also considered. The study looks at ‘soft’ penetration through an analysis of language, education, media, and civil society organizations, as well as “blatant penetration” like the occupation of Iraq and the spread of foreign military bases. Beyond Arab state actions, the paper also considers intervention by neighboring regional states. The paper finds that variation in the development of political, social, and economic systems has a corresponding influence on the levels of foreign penetration, infiltration, or influence. It also finds that analyzing the Arab region as a single regional system reveals a deep level of military, social, and economic penetration on all levels.

This paper explores the concept of “the Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), an outcome of the 2005 World Summit which entails that the international community has a moral duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in cases involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. The author illustrates the historical legacy of the R2P, covering how early legal philosophers justified the intervention of European powers through theories such as just war, intervention in the name of humanity, and humanitarian intervention, before exploring whether R2P represents a violation of well-established principles of international law: the sovereignty of states and non-intervention in their affairs and the non-use of force in international affairs. The paper concludes that R2P does not provide for the use of force in a manner that does not already exist in the UN Charter.

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict

One of the most important gains of Tunisia’s revolution has been that elections are no longer subject to interior ministry supervision. A look at these elections reveals a process managed by a permanent constitutional body, the Independent High Authority for Elections, which in itself marks a revolutionary success. These events are read within the context of the assassination of Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi, which caused many to worry that the democratic path would be hindered, as in other Arab Spring countries. More than the elections mechanism, this paper argues that success can also be attributed to the Troika alliance, especially the Ennahda party. It shows how the neutrality of the military institution and the great role played by the country’s General Labor Union in bridging the gap between Tunisian opponents through national dialogue, have largely contributed in the success of the elections.

Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World 1/11-31/12/2020.

A convergence of interests between the Houthi militia and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh have served to undermine the National Dialogue for the country, which had earlier formed an implementation mechanism for the GCC Initiative. Previously, the aims of that Dialogue were intended to further the cause of a federalist, democratic state which decentralized power. This would have changed the status quo, in which power was concentrated in what Yemenis call the “Holy Center”, a tribalist-sectarian concentration of political and financial power which been in place for a millennium and which survived into the reborn, unified and modern-day Yemen of 1994.