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Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]

One of the most important gains of Tunisia’s revolution has been that elections are no longer subject to interior ministry supervision. A look at these elections reveals a process managed by a permanent constitutional body, the Independent High Authority for Elections, which in itself marks a revolutionary success. These events are read within the context of the assassination of Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi, which caused many to worry that the democratic path would be hindered, as in other Arab Spring countries. More than the elections mechanism, this paper argues that success can also be attributed to the Troika alliance, especially the Ennahda party. It shows how the neutrality of the military institution and the great role played by the country’s General Labor Union in bridging the gap between Tunisian opponents through national dialogue, have largely contributed in the success of the elections.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

This paper analyzes the impact of the results of the legislative elections on the political process in Tunisia during the period from 2011 to 2021. It discusses the negative impact of the electoral system on the results of the legislative elections in general, and on the political process as a whole in particular. Due to the difficulty of the political parties that won first place in the legislative elections to obtain the required majority that enables them to bear responsibility for the political process alone during the parliamentary period. This created a state of parliamentary fragmentation that affected the Assembly of the Representatives of the People in three electoral cycles in 2011 , 2014 , and 2019 which led to the disruption of the legislative and electoral role of the Assembly, and the multiplicity and instability of governments. This paper also discusses proposals to amend the Tunisian Election and Referendum Law, which include a proposal to adopt an electoral threshold, and the impact of applying the electoral threshold on the representation of political parties in the Tunisian Assembly of People's Representatives, and on the political process.

​In this interview, Cheikh Rached Ghannouchi recounts his experiences of working with his “brothers” in the Ennahda movement,who, he claims, criticized his “ad hominem” attacks on ousted president Benali, in contrast to party policy—at the time—which forbade direct criticism of the former president. Cheikh Ghannouchi also reasserts his previous position that Islamists should avoid taking the reins of power—even when they win elections. This is to acknowledge, he says, the regional and global orders whichs imply would not tolerate Islamists in power.

The Tunisian Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement replicated the experience of the Egyptian movement of the same name after the latter’s success in changing the nation’s head of state. The study analyzes the factors that led to the emergence of the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, such as the difficulties facing the transitional process, the slow pace of reforms, and the failure to achieve the goals of the revolution. This long list of grievances ranges from the failure to create jobs and provide justice for victims of injustice, to the continuation of widespread poverty and unemployment in the cities, and the problematic struggle for influence instead of power sharing leading to polarization not only between al-Nahda Party and the Nidaa Tounes Movement, but also between the ruling coalition and the opposition. The study explores the most important commonalities and differences between the Egyptian Tamarod Movement and the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, wondering whether the latter can change from a protest phenomenon to a force for change, and what its future holds in light of the new developments in the urban and political scene in Tunisia today.

The Gulf states, as a center for oil and gas production, face the challenge of adapting to an increasingly uncertain energy landscape as new resources arrive in the market, and the reverberations of unstable demand and turbulent geostrategic conditions. The great challenge for these countries, in which social peace depends on unlimited consumption of subsidized energy, is to reduce consumption and develop alternative energy sources to conserve traditional fuels for export. The effects of these transformations are significant today, and the economic, social and political stability of these countries, as well as their ability to remain major players in the global energy system is at stake. Renewable energy policies, tailored to the unique political, economic and social conditions of each country, need to translate aspirations into swift practical action to succeed and rejuvenate the option of cooperation within a productive institutional framework.

Most initial readings have exhausted their explanations for failure, or stumbling, of the democratic transition process in Tunisia. Given the country’s weak political performance, lack of economic achievement, and worsening corruption, the need has emerged to consider the role of political culture in events since the Tunisian revolution up until President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency on 25 July 2021. Contrary to the prevailing trend in the literature on democratic transition, which has often overlooked the importance of a minimum level of civil political culture taking root, there is an urgent need to recognize its vital role in ensuring the success of any transitional process, especially in the early stages. This paper argues that the absence of a minimum level of political culture has contributed to the fragility of the transitional process in Tunisia, making democracy vulnerable to failure and to the reproduction of authoritarian patterns. Therefore, strengthening this culture becomes a necessity to ensure the sustainability of the democratic transition and avoid setbacks.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.

Early in the transitional justice process during and after the Tunisian revolution, the need arose to develop a full-fledged legal framework guaranteeing the rights of victims and, at the same time, of perpetrators. However, no sooner was transitional justice legislation ratified than progress towards the objective faltered. In an atmosphere of partisan political turbulence, the legislation resulted in weak outcomes. This led to the conclusion that the foremost problem of transitional justice does not lie in an absence of political will as much as in the philosophy on which it is founded. This philosophy adheres to liberal democratic values in facing the painful past and restoring rights to victims of despotism – by stipulating a set of rights that put the victim and the executioner on the same footing, without the slightest consideration of the balance of power between them. Consequently, perpetrators and torturers tend to dodge justice and recognition of truth, equating reconciliation with accountability.