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Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.

Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.

In recent years, phrases such as “migrant crisis” and “illegal migration” have gained increased currency as means of describing larger waves of migration to Europe. International law rests on the assumption that refuge and asylum are always “legitimate”, thus failing to provide a justification for the use of terms such as “illegal migration”. As a response, in this paper the author adopts the term “illicit migration” to refer to undeclared migration which does not pass through official channels, and which, he argues, is a clearer expression of the phenomenon currently underway, in which large numbers of migrants seek to secretly enter the borders of their destination countries. The topic under discussion has particular importance due to the reflexive way in which European countries tie migration to extremism. This has spurred European nations to increase reliance on an “iron shield” erected to isolate themselves from those landing on their shores from the southern end of the Mediterranean, and with no distinctions made between refugees legitimately seeking refuge from armed conflict and those seeking to “ride the wave”.

The premise of this study is the belief that there is a crisis in contemporary liberal democracy resulting from the tension between two traditions: one democratic and the other liberal. The spread of right-wing populism in the West is not a new phenomenon, but rather a new manifestation of what may be called a permanent crisis of democracy. The study distinguishes populism from totalitarian ideological movements that gain popular support through demagogy and incitement against the other and reviews existing tensions in the structure of liberal democracy. The paper finds that populist rhetoric is channeled through tensions in the structure of liberal democracy and translates social anger into criticism of the democratic system itself, by using one component of a complex democratic system against another.

This introductory essay highlights the considerations that prompted this in-depth look at the state of political science in Arab academic institutions, and made it essential. For political science, and the humanities and social sciences more generally, play a central role in any societal renaissance. Our experience of teaching graduate level political science at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies has already indicated to us that the situation of the discipline in Arab universities was not at all rosy. This impression was confirmed by many studies, conferences, and forums organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which revealed a huge gap of knowledge in the field. This made it imperative to undertake an evaluation of what Arab universities were offering in their efforts to guide students to master the discipline up to global standards. The studies in this special issue, and the following one, highlight a multi-layered crisis in the field, impacting teaching, research, and employment prospects. The studies point to the late arrival of the discipline in the region, the limited areas covered, inadequate resources, and a lag behind international achievements in the field. The crisis is complicated by a number political, economic, social and structural obstacles that hold the discipline back from achieving its potential. This introduction summarizes and assesses the findings of the studies included in this special issue, and the second part in the following one, one emergence, evolution and achievements of the discipline, and the impediment obstructing its progress and maturity in the region. It focuses on case studies from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia, adding surveys and reflections on methodologies and theoretical challenges. It concludes that despite some major achievements and progress, the biggest obstacle to progress in the discipline remains the absence of viable scholarly communities, both regionally and nationally in in each country. The essay offers proposals to address this problem.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

This study examines the role of identity, ideas, norms, and interests in shaping the Arab regional order across different historical periods, building on Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach. It critically evaluates both the explanatory power and inherent constraints of this approach in explaining regional dynamics within the Arab region. The study focuses on pivotal junctures linked to major events such as the Baghdad Pact (1955), the 1967 defeat, the Gulf War (1990), the Iraq invasion (2003), and the Arab Spring (2011). It demonstrates how these events reshaped regional identities through competing narratives and dominant dichotomies, where actors' legitimacy depended on their ability to impose narratives and redefine core issues. The study concludes that identity politics and normative frameworks played a central role in shaping regional policies and dynamics. Regional conflicts mainly manifested as struggles over ideational factors and positional roles rather than crude power maximization. Although constructivism offers valuable insights into how identity shapes regional interactions, its explanatory scope remains partial. As with all IR theoretical perspectives, it emphasizes certain dimensions while neglecting others.

This study conducts research on the traditional academic methods used in the Arab scholarly community. Specifically, it employs the case of legal science when addressing the following questions: Is the Arab academy in its field suffering from academic dependency? What forms does this take and what are the reasons behind it? Where does reviewing theoretical or conceptual frameworks of legal science fall in this? This study focuses on law as a method of social control in the methodological crisis undergone by the social sciences. This study refers to two crises examined by Arab legal science: identity crisis and functional crisis. These are illustrated by two main indicators: The gap between the quantitative growth of the number of law students and the weak production of legal research knowledge, the gap between the quantitative development of the educational institutions of law and of legal structures.