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​Settlement and occupation of Arab lands constitute paramount values in Zionist ideology and are highly important in the politics of all Zionist currents, be they secular, religious, leftist or rightist. Settlement in the West Bank and the occupied Eastern Jerusalem is a constant central colonial policy through which Israel seeks to achieve what it failed to do in the 1948 war, that is control the largest surface area of lands accommodating the least number of Arab-Palestinian citizens. As soon as Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian territories in the six-day war in June 1967, it started building settlements. Since 1967, Israel has gradually developed its colonial settlement project in the occupied Palestinian territories. This paper examines the stalling policy that Israel is adopting by using double standards: it caves to international pressures at times, while it expedites its settlement pace at other times.

Israel is following the strategic changes in the region arising from the Arab revolutions with great anxiety. It is aware that its chances to control the process of change underway, and all the changes arising from it, are limited. Despite this, it is trying its utmost to minimize the negative effects of these changes on its standing in the region. This article deals with Israeli positions towards these geostrategic changes, foremost among them the fall of a number of dictatorial regimes, some of which Israel relied upon to guarantee its security. The establishment of democratic regimes in a number of Arab states threatens to disrupt the balance that was tipped in favor of Israel's security. Examined in this study is the decline of American influence in the Arab region, the prospect of change in Israeli-American relations, as well as the possibility of Israel losing its monopoly over non-conventional weapons because of the Arab Spring. To conclude, a review of the Israeli position on the revolution in Syria is also offered.

International alliances, cooperation, and coordination are no longer limited to state bodies or international organizations; criminal and terrorist groups working in organized crime have also formed international networks in order to develop activities, implement plans, and achieve objectives. Despite the differences in structure and purpose between terrorist networks and criminal groups, converging interests have led to cooperation and mutual coordination. This increases the strength of both and makes it hard for authorities to control and define them. North Africa is a living example of these alliances, particularly around drug trafficking given the geographic characteristics of the region that spans Asia, Africa, and Europe. This means North Africa is a key route for drugs smuggled from around the world to Europe in particular. It is also a strategic region for terrorist groups, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in particular. With drug networks in need of protection to secure safe passage of goods, and terrorist groups’ need for sufficient funds to finance and implement plans; the region has witnessed a dangerous alliance between the two parties. This alliance has created a major challenge for countries in the region, which have been forced to confront a double threat. This treat necessitates the development of new strategies.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

Iraq’s former foreign minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi provides an account of the details of the campaign led by the United States against Iraq on August 2, 1990. He explains the measures Iraq took in the period between March 1991 and March 2003 to avoid a second war that was clearly on the way. According to this testimony, the United States began its preparations to wage another war on Iraq the day after the end of the first war, which was brought about by Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The testimony includes details of the egregious measures that prepared Western public opinion to accept waging another war on Iraq despite the cooperation the country exhibited with American demands. It also explains how many of the measures employed under the cover of international legitimacy aimed to impoverish Iraq and destroy its foundations.

This paper shall explore the historic shift in relations which has brought Russia and Turkey closer together, with a focus on the domains in which these two powers now cooperate. It shall examine in particular the impact of this new level of cooperation on their policies in the Arab region. The specific set of economic and political circumstances prevailing at the beginning of the twenty-first century have driven Russia and Turkey to revisit the nature of their centuries-long relations, which have previously been dominated by conflict and competition for influence. As two neighboring, great powers both of which are looking to adopt a new strategy to reclaim their imperial pasts on the world stage, Russia and Turkey are now compelled to cooperate, particularly in the economic domain. Yet even as the shared interests of these two countries expand, it has not brought an end to their contradictory sets of regional alliances in the Middle East which have placed them in a zero-sum game.

This paper uses the findings of the 2015 Arab Opinion Index to gauge Arab public attitudes towards the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, the international agreement which brought to a close a world crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. The paper also explores Arab attitudes towards the possibility of Iranian non-compliance with the terms of the agreement as well as the possible transformation of Iran into a nuclear capable state. The findings reflect a sharp division within Arab public opinion: 43% of respondents expressed the belief that Iran would abide by the terms of the agreement, with 46% predicting that the country would not follow through with the terms of the multilateral treaty.

This paper presents the findings of a number of public opinion polls surrounding public attitudes towards the Palestinian Cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author focuses on three distinct themes/questions: Do respondents believe that the Palestinian Cause concerns all Arabs, or merely the Palestinians themselves? The second theme concerns Arab public opinion towards the peace treaties signed by the Arab states and Israel. The third theme covers Arab public support for, and opposition, the official recognition of Israel by their governments. The results show a wide-reaching and deep consensus across the countries surveyed in support of pan-Arab solidarity with the Palestinians, and in opposition to official recognition of Israel by their governments. The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel was the most accepted such agreement, supported by 27% of the aggregate respondents, contributed to by 44% of Egyptians, and opposed by 54%.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.