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In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

An agreement signed by the Russian Foreign Minister and his US counterpart in Moscow has taken observers by surprise due to its timing and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement in Moscow was the natural culmination of a series of events impacting the situation in Syria, including changes to the composition of Barack Obama’s Administration and an overall shift in American attitudes towards the Arab Spring. This has presaged a change in American vision towards its interests in the wider Middle East region and Washington’s relations with both regional powers and global players with influence on the Syrian conflict. Finally, the agreement can be regarded as an expression of American uncertainty, as well as the Obama Administration’s inability to formulate a coherent policy towards Syria two years into the revolution.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

عنوان الكتاب: الجهادية العربية: اندماج الأبعاد - النكاية والتمكين بين "الدولة الإسلامية" و"قاعدة الجهاد". المؤلف: حسن أبو هنية. سنة النشر: 2018. الناشر: المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات. مكان النشر: الدوحة/ بيروت. عدد الصفحات: 624 صفحة.

Book Title: Abdullah Gul and the Making of the New Turkey [English] Author: Gerald MacLean Year of publication: 2014 Publisher: One World - London Pages: 368 (large format)

Developments in the international system have led to a diminishing role of nations within international affairs.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition from 1/1/2016 to 29/2/2016.