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The presence of the external factor is usually related to the context of the popular hirak, the periods of political transition and the transitional phases in many countries. This factor is evident in countries with a geopolitical position in regional and international competition. This study discusses the variable of the external factor in the 22 February 2019 hirak in Algeria by examining the limits of international and regional interventions in steering the course of the popular hirak compared to other Arab cases where the external factor seemed to be more influential. It aims to discuss the determinants of Algeria's relations with regional and international powers and to explain the issue of the lack of external interference in the popular hirak, ending with the modalities of the future of the turbulent political path and discussing the possibilities of transformation from abroad. The study concludes that the lack of regional and international intervention in the popular hirak is mainly related to geopolitical and strategic constraints, far from value and normative considerations. The behaviour of external forces is determined by Algeria's geopolitical situation. The risks of instability in the country would create highly complex security challenges in the Mediterranean region. Added to this is the importance of Algeria in assessing the strategic balances in the region, especially for European security.

This paper presents the findings of a number of public opinion polls surrounding public attitudes towards the Palestinian Cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author focuses on three distinct themes/questions: Do respondents believe that the Palestinian Cause concerns all Arabs, or merely the Palestinians themselves? The second theme concerns Arab public opinion towards the peace treaties signed by the Arab states and Israel. The third theme covers Arab public support for, and opposition, the official recognition of Israel by their governments. The results show a wide-reaching and deep consensus across the countries surveyed in support of pan-Arab solidarity with the Palestinians, and in opposition to official recognition of Israel by their governments. The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel was the most accepted such agreement, supported by 27% of the aggregate respondents, contributed to by 44% of Egyptians, and opposed by 54%.

This study addresses a longstanding and renewed subject in the case of Sudan: the continual interference of military formations and elites in political authority and the instability of post-independence civil governance. It uses a compound methodology blending a historical reading of political events and developments with a descriptive reading of the present reality, in its domestic and foreign dimensions, and a forecast of Sudan's future in light of the current situation. The study observes that the plurality of regional, ethnic, and military structures, instead of being a constructive and integrating aspect of the Sudanese state and nation, has reflected negatively on the country's unity and its political and security stability. Since independence, these formations have remained in confrontation, whether between one another or among the internal parts and divisions of each. Evidence for this claim is found in Sudan's complex crises, including that of governance, the South, Darfur, the current transitional period, and the struggle for power presently raging between military branches.

This paper seeks to ascertain the extent of positive Arab public attitudes—or lack thereof—towards the Arab popular revolutions, after more than a year since the revolutions first broke out. The results show an overall positive attitude towards the Arab revolutions among the Arab public. When asked to provide reasons for their positive disposition towards the revolutions, respondents spoke of an "Arab Awakening" which laid the foundations for democratic governance in the Arab region by restoring the democratic rights of Arab citizens. Opposition to the Arab revolutions and their impacts accounted for only 25% of Arab public opinion. A majority of respondents who disapproved of the Arab revolutions blamed the failure of these popular movements to achieve their aims, as well as the resulting economic and political instability. In addition to broad overall support for the Arab revolutions, the Arab public credits the recent revolutions with improved treatment of the public by the police and other government officials in the Arab region.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

This study explores the use of sports as a diplomatic soft power tool employed by states to achieve foreign policy objectives. It adopts a constructivist framework that highlights the role of symbolic factors in shaping state behaviour. Focusing on Qatar, as a small state lacking traditional power resources, the study examines how its leadership turned to alternative tools, notably sports, as a strategic means of influence. Qatari sports diplomacy relies on four main pillars: investing in global sports clubs, developing infrastructure and hosting major sporting events, investing in sports media, and supporting local sports. This strategic use of sport has contributed to redefining Qatar's role and enhancing its international standing, enabling it to exercise political and economic influence and to support the diversification of its national economy.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

This study reassesses the experience of political openness in Algeria within the analytical and explanatory categories of political economy. It is built on the premise that the transition from a totalitarian authoritarian regime to a democratic one presupposes the transition from a rentier economy linked to the external market and dominated by rentier groups, to a productive economy based on the national bourgeoisie exploitation of local labour to create wealth. The study argues that the experience of democratic transition in Algeria faltered due to the failure of the rentier groups to undergo capitalist transformation that could have allowed the emergence of the two main sides of the democratic equation: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The political elites that control the rentier economy were willing to accept political but not economic reforms that could have led to a reconsideration of the hegemonic relations within society and liberated it from the grip of power. In this regard, the failure of the economic reforms introduced by the Hamrouche government (1989 - 1991) was a prelude to the disruption of the democratic transition and prevention of the development of a civil society capable of gaining its independence from authority and, on the other hand, the independence of the Algerian state from the global market.

This study deals with transnational Shiism and the dynamics of relations between the Shiʿi religious establishment and the post-colonial state in Iraq. It sheds light on two aspects of transnational Shiism. First, the evolution and internal dynamics of religious authority, especially in terms of adapting its transnational domain to the Iraqi national context. The study argues that the relationship between Shiʿi religious establishment and the state was often characterized by tension, as the state sought to consolidate its power within its borders. Yet, after 2003, the nature of relations between the two has significantly changed, leading to new configurations of authority. Second, the increasing polarization between activist transnational Shiism, which is today led by the Iranian state, and Iraq-centric Shiism became a key factor in shaping power relations in post-2003 Iraq.