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This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

This paper discusses the relationship between Egypt’s military and security institutions, on the one hand, and the forces of the revolutionary movement since January 25 2011, on the other. It evaluates this relationship by looking at how it evolved during Egypt’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. It achieves this by breaking events down into three main phases: an initial transitional phase managed directly by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); Mohamed Morsi’s presidency; and the revolutionary movement after Morsi’s ouster. Based on observations of the three main junctures, this paper carries out a detailed reading of the major events in each phase and analyzes the impact that each had when it came to shaping the relationship between the military and security institutions. The paper sees distinct characteristics of the relationship between these central institutions at each phase, and assesses the impact of these different moments on the political process in Egypt more generally

This study limits its aim to a discussion of the water policy of Egypt and Ethiopia. It will first lay out the Ethiopian view and the nation's reaction to the escalation of Egyptian media coverage calling for a direct war against Ethiopia after the country's insistence on the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which would disrupt the flow of water to Egypt. With Egypt regularly in control of 85% of the Nile's water, the dam would create a massive change in the water situation in the country. This paper shows the history of the conflict over the water of the Nile between Ethiopia (an Upstream Country) and Egypt (the only Downstream Country) and the position of Ethiopia on old agreements between the parties. The paper presents Ethiopian writings published since the revolution of January 25, 2011 by way of understanding the nation's viewpoint on the issue. ​

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

​This study discusses several hypotheses proposed by political culture literature, especially those that adopt a structural approach to understanding the relationship of social structures and institutions to actors, and the values generated by the nature of this relationship that inspire political action. The paper posits that research into the pattern of political culture arising from the relationship between social structures and actors is not limited to studying this direct relationship, but rather requires an examination of intermediary factors. Hence, the study outlines a supportive conceptual interpretive framework, through Pierre Bourdieu's Social Theory. It begins by reviewing the concepts discussed by Bourdieu to explain the relationship between social structures and actors. The second section presents a comparative analysis of concepts taken from political culture and those of Bourdieu that explain the emergence of political culture through the reciprocal relationship between social structures and actors. The third examines the outcomes of this comparison in light of the 2007 Palestinian political division.

Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]

The phenomenon of armed groups operating in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula is a growing one. This paper presents the history of this phenomenon as well as factors leading up to the violent encounters with state forces from former president Hosni Mubarak to Mohamad Morsi and the military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It examines different factors that led to the severe clash between groups and state forces, and the causes that saw the clash become widespread and even violent. The paper examines the role of state forces in escalating the conflict, and takes into account the religious authorities that these groups stem from, as well as the factors that affected their political views. It further examines what seemed an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and efforts at coordination to fight these groups. Based on personal interviews of groups in the Sinai and collected testimonies, the paper makes a core contribution to understanding the current events in the Sinai and their wider political context. ​

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.