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This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

The Egyptian revolution in 2011 and its related aftershocks in 2013 represent developments in a process that will decide a struggle within Egypt that has lasted over a century.

This paper discusses the relationship between Egypt’s military and security institutions, on the one hand, and the forces of the revolutionary movement since January 25 2011, on the other. It evaluates this relationship by looking at how it evolved during Egypt’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. It achieves this by breaking events down into three main phases: an initial transitional phase managed directly by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); Mohamed Morsi’s presidency; and the revolutionary movement after Morsi’s ouster. Based on observations of the three main junctures, this paper carries out a detailed reading of the major events in each phase and analyzes the impact that each had when it came to shaping the relationship between the military and security institutions. The paper sees distinct characteristics of the relationship between these central institutions at each phase, and assesses the impact of these different moments on the political process in Egypt more generally

This paper examines the 2012 General National Congress (GNC) elections in Libya, analyzing their implications and the interpretations that framed them as a victory for the liberal bloc (the National Forces Alliance) over the Islamist faction (the Justice and Construction Party and its allies). The paper reveals that this interpretation lacks accuracy, highlighting that a significant number of winning independent candidates were affiliated with Islamist movements. It also argues that Islamists later succeeded in consolidating their control within the GNC, leveraging their alliances to pass laws that excluded their political opponents. These elections marked a turning point in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi, representing the country's first democratic experiment in building a new political system despite the challenges inherited from the previous era. The paper examines the electoral system, key competitors, election results, and internal conflicts within the GNC, concluding that Islamist dominance after 2012 challenges the idea of a liberal victory.

The phenomenon of armed groups operating in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula is a growing one. This paper presents the history of this phenomenon as well as factors leading up to the violent encounters with state forces from former president Hosni Mubarak to Mohamad Morsi and the military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It examines different factors that led to the severe clash between groups and state forces, and the causes that saw the clash become widespread and even violent. The paper examines the role of state forces in escalating the conflict, and takes into account the religious authorities that these groups stem from, as well as the factors that affected their political views. It further examines what seemed an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and efforts at coordination to fight these groups. Based on personal interviews of groups in the Sinai and collected testimonies, the paper makes a core contribution to understanding the current events in the Sinai and their wider political context. ​

This paper examines the implications of Egypt’s military coup on Gaza and its ruling party Hamas. This study is undertaken in light of the escalation of Egyptian media incitement against Hamas and the Palestinians, including accusations that the movement was involved in violent acts on Egyptian soil during the January 2011 Revolution. These rumored actions are paralleled with apparent recent involvement of Hamas in the “terrorist” attacks in the Sinai. Since media incitement has resulted in the tightening of an Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and the destruction of tunnels that represented the lifeline of people in the coastal enclave, a full investigation of the allegations is critical.​

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

​This article discusses relations between Sudan and Iran against the background of the many Israeli air strikes against Sudan, and asks whether the ruling regime in Sudan favors Iran over the Arab states when it comes to dealing with its political and security concerns, or whether Sudan sees no issue in playing both sides. It also examines the dreams of Islamic leadership and the transnational revolutionary tendency espoused by Hassan al-Turabi, and the effect of this among his disciples in terms of their view of and links with Iran. The study also takes Iranian support for Islamic movements in Gaza via Sudan as an example of cooperation where the tactical and short term intersects with long term strategy. The paper also discusses the Islamists’ coming to power as a result of the Arab revolutions, and the potential for the revival of transnational revolution included in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and the effect of this on relations between the Arab states and their collective and individual relations with Iran.

عنوان الكتاب في لغته: Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. عنوان الكتاب: احتواء حماس: صعود مقاومة فلسطينية وركودها. المؤلف: طارق بقعوني Tareq Baconi. الناشر: Stanford University Press. سنة النشر: 2018. عدد الصفحات: 368 صفحة.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.