Latest Articles

Book Title: Class Struggle in Contemporary Egypt: Introduction to the January 25, 2011 Revolution [Arabic]

Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

Although women have been present in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since its inception, their status in the organization and political role has been restricted by Brotherhood thinking that promotes a division of roles in society on the basis of biological difference, and that emphasizes the primary role for women being in the private sphere and their central function being in the family. During the short period of democratic opening up that followed the January 25 revolution, the political participation of Brotherhood women increased. Following the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, women went beyond the frameworks and roles assigned to them. They took to the streets and for the first time in the history of the Brotherhood were at the forefront of the movement of protest and opposition against the political regime. In spite of these visible developments, this paper holds that these shifts derived from the absence of Brotherhood men, and does not reflect a shift in the ideology. For these development to have an impact on the power relations between men and women in the movement, and to lead to the political and organizational empowerment of women, there should be a fundamental change in the movement’s vision of women in general.

This paper focuses first on the rising role of the army in Egyptian political life after the January 25 Revolution. Starting with its break away from former president Hosni Mubarak, to its assumption of power in taking on the task of managing the transitional period by overseeing the constitutional referendum as well as parliamentary and presidential elections, the paper traces critical moments and shifts in the relationship between the army, the people, and politics. The paper also documents the decline in the role of the army after Mohamed Morsi came to power, and after what is termed a “paradigm shift” represented by ousting Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, and other members of the military council from the political scene. The paper then surveys within a theoretical framework the relationship of armies to democracy, offering examples of military interference in political life and comparing these with what happened in Egypt. Finally, the paper turns to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ultimatum, his request for authority and the subsequent fallout that put both sides of the crisis in Egypt on the brink of the abyss.

A literature review of the major writings that covered the Arab Spring during the last five years

Book Title: 25 January: Research and Testimony [Arabic]

Rights groups and social movements in Egypt, including the April 6 Youth Movement developed the Transitional Justice Law based on previous experiences worldwide such as the South African one. Tunisia, which was the starting point of the Arab revolutions, beat Egypt to it by cooperating with the Ministry of Justice in South Africa. In 2003, Morocco established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to look into human rights abuses from 1956-1999. This paper discusses the possibility of implementing the notion of transitional justice in Egypt and tries to use an approach that puts the national reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms in their wider framework, i.e. democratic transition and institutional reform based on negotiations with political forces. The paper explores the philosophy of transitional justice, the organizational qualities that contribute to its success and the conditions that help overcome any arising challenges or possible resistance.

This paper examines the implications of Egypt’s military coup on Gaza and its ruling party Hamas. This study is undertaken in light of the escalation of Egyptian media incitement against Hamas and the Palestinians, including accusations that the movement was involved in violent acts on Egyptian soil during the January 2011 Revolution. These rumored actions are paralleled with apparent recent involvement of Hamas in the “terrorist” attacks in the Sinai. Since media incitement has resulted in the tightening of an Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and the destruction of tunnels that represented the lifeline of people in the coastal enclave, a full investigation of the allegations is critical.​

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.