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The rise of China as a new global power has placed a non-Western actor at the center of world politics; an actor with no colonial or imperialist history. Analyzing China's regional and global influence, the study follows the historical context of its rise and growth in a record period of time, making it a major global economic and military power. The study aims to shed light on the rise of Chinese Asian power, and the controversy that accompanied this. It will attempt to explain the causes that helped this rise take place and the potential for growth and development. The study also explains the obstacles that could hinder further Chinese growth and ascendancy, as well as the impact of China's rise on the world, and the regional and international positions vis-à-vis this rise.

According to the World Bank indicators, the Maghreb youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. After the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the youth aspirations and expectations clashed with the economic difficulties and political reality in the Maghreb countries, which are unable to provide employment opportunities and efficient solutions to youth major problems. In the light of this situation, we analyzed (using quantitative methods) the satisfaction degree of young people under the effect of economic challenges and political transformations in the Maghreb region. It is clear from the results that the Maghreb youth adhere more to the economic priority, despite other priorities related to administrative corruption, the lack of public services, the fight against terrorism and insecurity. The second conclusion is that the youth economic expectations create a kind of homogeneity in this region. In all the observed countries, most young people consider the economy as the first priority, as well as the entire population.

Economic inequality is one of the most pressing issues in the twenty-first century, given that a small minority controls the global economy and most influential power. This has led to an escalation of political instability and a decrease in social inclusion, as evidenced by studies related to the Arab Spring and the ongoing turmoil in the MENA. This quantitative study investigates the effect of capital formation and the rate of return on capital on economic inequality in countries of the region. The results demonstrated that the factors used to measure the formation of capital, such as total domestic savings and total fixed capital formation, positively correlate with economic inequality - increasing the inequality gap. Conversely, factors used to measure the rate of return on capital, such as real interest and the interest rate on deposits, correspond negatively with economic inequality. When the interest rate on deposits increases, economic inequality decreases. It is necessary to review fiscal and monetary policies to reform taxes and benefits to increase their impact on equity and redistribution, and to avoid the impact of capital and power accumulation.

Current scholarship on elections in authoritarian regimes has focused on exploring the relationship between elections and democratization, and it has generally used analytical frameworks and methods imported from the study of genuinely democratic elections to do so. These tendencies have kept scholars from asking a wide range of questions about the micro-level dynamics of authoritarian elections and the systematic differences among them. With these issues in mind, this review examines literature that investigates the purpose of elections in dictatorships; the electoral behavior of voters, candidates, and incumbents in these elections; and the link between elections and democratization. The review ends with a call to redirect the study of authoritarian elections toward uncovering and explaining the important differences among them.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.

​​This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.​

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, neorealist theory came under severe scrutiny. During its growth stages, the theory encountered unavoidable conceptual and empirical impediments, which cast doubt on its capacity to overcome such hurdles. This was the challenge that neorealist theory faced when the concepts of "anarchy" and "balance" were questioned. In terms of empiricism, the criticism focused on the neorealism inability to represent the new realities of the international system, notably US hegemony. This study evaluates the progressiveness or degenerassive of the neorealism research program in an attempt to assess the theory's progressivism and degenerative by examining the adjustments and improvements made to the ideas of anarchy and balance. It is based on the methodology of the Imre Lakatos Scientific Research Program as an evaluation tool.

This study begins by discussing the concept of legitimacy and then examines the patterns of legitimacy in Egypt since 2013. It specifically focuses on the legitimacy of performance within the field of educational policies and its role in the regime's continuity. The study finds that the regime cannot establish its own legitimacy merely by creating an illusion of effective performance. Instead, it can manage legitimacy through several strategies: shaping public expectations by emphasizing the importance of maintaining public order and providing basic goods and services; influencing public perceptions by highlighting achievements while concealing failures and suppressing criticism; and managing citizens' perceptions of alternatives, such as Islamist groups or a descent into chaos, or both. The study also concludes that the regime's objective is not to secure genuine popular support but to ensure general compliance by persuading the majority that it is more effective in improving their lives than any alternative. This level of legitimacy may be sufficient to encourage adherence to laws and discourage efforts to replace the regime.

Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

Oil is not just related to economics but is also connected to political development. This paper looks at the effect of oil on democracy by relying on a theoretical and empirical study using the tools of descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and statistical tests in the light of political economy in the form of the “resource curse.” It studies how authoritarian regimes have used hydrocarbon resources to prevent democratization by means of a range of mechanisms such as the tax impact, group formation, the effect of spending, and repression. The statistical analysis reveals that there is a statistically-significant inverse relationship between democracy and oil production. It can be said therefore that the oil states are less likely to become democratic. Although most Third-World states have been afflicted by the resource curse, it is not possible to view it as inevitable, but rather the result of dependence on the track represented by the inability to diversify resources or weakness in doing so. The resource curse does not apply to all states rich in natural resources, such as Norway.