Latest Articles

This study provides an analysis of Egypt's political system since 2013 , with a particular focus on President Sisi's efforts to establish and manage a "new republic." It explores the internal factors that influence the structure and nature of the regime and examines the regional and international contexts that shape this endeavor and contribute to its support, despite concerns over authoritarian practices and significant human rights violations. the study aims to elucidate the foundational principles, defining characteristics, and key dimensions of the "new republic." It also evaluates its strengths, prospects for success, functional role, and the reasons for substantial international endorsement of the regime. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which the regime's rhetoric regarding the new republic aligns with practical realities and appraises President Sisi's efficacy in implementing this vision.

​This study discusses several hypotheses proposed by political culture literature, especially those that adopt a structural approach to understanding the relationship of social structures and institutions to actors, and the values generated by the nature of this relationship that inspire political action. The paper posits that research into the pattern of political culture arising from the relationship between social structures and actors is not limited to studying this direct relationship, but rather requires an examination of intermediary factors. Hence, the study outlines a supportive conceptual interpretive framework, through Pierre Bourdieu's Social Theory. It begins by reviewing the concepts discussed by Bourdieu to explain the relationship between social structures and actors. The second section presents a comparative analysis of concepts taken from political culture and those of Bourdieu that explain the emergence of political culture through the reciprocal relationship between social structures and actors. The third examines the outcomes of this comparison in light of the 2007 Palestinian political division.

Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

The paper studies the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, from a geopolitical perspective. It argues that this conflict has historical and political roots, not solely tied to the natural availability of water in the Tigris and Euphrates, but rather connected to the policies of different parties in managing water resources. The paper includes three essential elements. The first examines the geographical and hydrological characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates. The second explores the political and academic discourse in the 1990s regarding the "water war" theory. The third and final element analysed the characteristics of the new conditions that have distinguished the three countries since the beginning of this century, imposing on Syria and Iraq the need to devise a new vision for managing their available water resources. The research concludes with the inevitability of negotiation for the joint management of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources as it is not in Turkey's interest to ignore the interests of downstream countries. Moreover, Syria and Iraq cannot achieve any results without negotiation and water diplomacy.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013, examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.