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Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

​This paper addresses a theoretical model for the concept of "consociational democracy", beginning with the concept's roots in the Austrian Marxist tradition before describing its elaboration in 1969 by the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart. Lijphart's work was part of his wider critique of Gabriel Almond's categorization of Western political systems. This study presents a structural criticism of the term "consociational democracy" and its usage, arguing that the practice of "consociational democracy" was born of pragmatic policies before maturing into a theoretical model. It argues that the subsequent contributions of Lijphart were merely an extrapolation from a set of examples without "theory" to underpin it and that "power sharing" does not necessarily lead to democratization. The study thus draws up several theoretical observations that help distinguish "consociationalism" from "consociational democracy". Finally, the paper contrasts the suitability of this theoretical model for both Northern Ireland and Lebanon.