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The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.

Today, India is actively engaged in projecting its influence beyond its geographic proximity. It has a proactive policy based on national interests and driven by its growing needs, particularly for energy imports, and an ambition to achieve a position of global prominence. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is of great geopolitical importance to India's strategy because of its geographic proximity, the abundance of energy resources, the great financial assets, and as the place with the largest Indian immigrant community. Nevertheless, many regional contenders may challenge India's interests in the region. This article discusses the geopolitical and economic importance of the GCC states and their current position in India's strategy. It explores the driving forces behind novel strategic partnerships between them. It also analyses how third-party relations with the GCC states or India may affect their relationships, such as China, Pakistan, and Iran. It also focuses on the new containment policy of India and China and their geopolitical contest over the Gulf and the GCC's hydrocarbon and financial assets.

The phenomenon of shale oil has returned to the forefront of politics. Unconventional oil and gas have been known to exist for some time and are available in large quantities. But the high cost of production has prevented their commercial extraction in the past. The rise of the price of oil since early 2001, however, has reignited interest. This paper examines this new interest and its impact on the price of oil in international markets. It also looks at the possible repercussions that could emerge in the long run among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States on the economic, political and geostrategic levels. The oil shale resources available globally could enable this resource to become one of the most important unconventional fuel sources in the world. In addition to its ubiquitous presence in North America, it is available in large quantities in Brazil, historic Palestine, Jordan, Indonesia, China, Australia, Estonia, France, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and South Africa. If these countries, which include major industrial nations and others on their way to become significant industrial forces, were to begin extracting their oil, all the economic, political and geostrategic calculations that have been based on conventional fuel will have to be reconsidered.

​This paper aims to analyze European Gulf relations based on the Interdependence created by the 1988 agreement, and the subsequent transformations in the relationships. The interdependence approach assumes that there is an overlap of interests between both parties, and a degree of mutual engagement, thus limiting conflict and enhancing cooperation and coordination, which entails harmonizing the movement of its parties within the international system. Nonetheless testing the effectiveness of this approach in the context of a crisis which divides one of the parties (the Gulf in our case) remains problematic. The paper tries to probe this issue, and reveal the limitations of the interdependence model in this context. It similarly attempts to test the impact of the Gulf Crisis on a European Sub Policy towards the Gulf by analyzing the behaviours of the main actors in the EU (Germany, France, and- despite brexit- the UK).

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.

​Using a realist approach, this study explains the development of international institutions in the Arab system, taking the Arab League and the Arab Monetary Fund as case studies. It puts to the test realist assumptions regarding states as major actors in the international system and examines how the principle of chaos and the absence of central authority affect their behaviour. In this context, the prisoner's dilemma is used as a mirror for security interactions and chaotic structures in the Arab and international systems. The study shows that realist assumptions are not sufficient to explain the development of Arab institutions; they need to be modified to explain the variation in international behaviour in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on an analysis of the reward environment in which Arab countries interact, and its division into a security-military sphere and a political-economic sphere.

ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻣﻨﺬ أواﺧﺮ أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017 أزﻣﺔ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻫﻲ ا ﻛﺜﺮ ﺣﺪةً ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ ﻋﺎم 1981. ﺑﺪأت ا زﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﻤﻠﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴّﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻗﺎدﺗﻬﺎ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ إﻋﻼم ﺳﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وإﻣﺎراﺗﻴﺔ. وﺑﺨﻼف أزﻣﺔ ﺳﺤﺐ اﻟﺴﻔﺮاء ﻋﺎم 2014، أﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﺛﻼث دول ﺧﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، واﻣﺎرات ﻣﻊ ﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 2017، ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﻓﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺛﻢ ﺳﻠ ﻤﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺐ، وأﻣﻬﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻳﺎم ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ أو ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ. وﻓﻲ اﻃﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ، ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪول إﻟﻰ ﻋﺰل ﻗﻄﺮ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴًﺎ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺒﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻀﻮع، ﻏﻴﺮ أنّ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﺑﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﺗﺠﺎه ازﻣﺔ، وﺑﺪأت ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺪور اﻟﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ. ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺬور ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺎراﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺮﺟﺔ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺗﺪاﺧﻞ أدوار ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﻦ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺪوﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ. Since late May 2017, the Gulf region has been witness to the most intense diplomatic crisis since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Tis paper attempts to highlight the roots of the present-day Gulf crisis and explore the potential, complicated outcomes, taking in the roles of various regional and global players. Te crisis begun with a vicious smear campaign against Qatar and led by Saudi- and Emirati-state owned media. In contrast to the 2014 diplomatic rif in which the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were withdrawn from Doha, this latest crisis also included a complete severing of diplomatic ties on the part of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in addition to Egypt.To this was later added a complete blockade of Qatar by air, sea and land. Te countries leading the siege on Doha later presented a ten-point ultimatum to Qatar to fulfill within 10 days. A further attempt by the countries leading the blockade to isolate Qatar on the world stage failed, however, as leading world powers opted to play a more constructive role and mediate an end to the crisis.