Latest Articles

Donald Trump's election as President of the United States came as a surprise for many. His positions on international trade, climate change, the future of the EU, NATO, and relations with Russia have sent shockwaves throughout the western world. Although these ideas never constituted a coherent philosophy, if transformed into policy directions, they would threaten the very foundations of the Liberal World Order as commonly understood today. Even if Trump does not act on the most radical pledges made during his election campaign, by positioning himself as the antithesis of the Obama administration he would still bring notable change to US foreign policy. The extent of that chage is now open to question as leaders and publics around the world are bracing themselves for what comes next.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

This study explores the concept of "deep cultural genocide" in the context of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2023 - 2024. It seeks to expand this concept to encompass tangible cultural genocide, which includes the systematic destruction or appropriation of heritage and cultural symbols, the erasure of identity, and dehistoricization. In addition to the deep cultural genocide aimed at depriving one party in the conflict of narrating events and presenting its narrative to the world, The study examines how this narrative facilitated the genocide, attempted to justify it, and contributed to the prolonged silence surrounding its continuation for many months.Utilizing a critical perspective grounded in cultural and media studies, the study incorporates the concepts of "c ultivation," "c ultural bias," and "m anufacturing consent." The findings reveal that during this war on Gaza, Israel transitioned from practicing slow cultural genocide, a method driven by colonial powers for over a century, to executing a "deep cultural genocide." This approach not only involved the systematic and direct destruction of Palestinian heritage and culture but also extended to efforts to extinguish the Palestinian narrative and prevent its dissemination to a global audience.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

Our study aims to put under scrutiny the Algerian army tasks and roles through different periods of time and this requires going back to the roots when the national liberation army was established, returning to the present as the army has become the institution protecting the state. An institution which has an everlasting organic relation with politics, embodying one of its central tasks. The study needs to highlight the above cited issues in its attempt to grasp and understand the army role during the 1992s' political crisis, and in so doing a particular attention is given to the ways how the army dealt with the crisis and what is the nature of its contribution in tackling and facing it. Finally, the study is concerned with the army role in the near future from a prospective approach.

​This article debates the significance of cultural differences in the identification and application of principles of sport governance. It attempts at refuting the underlying assumption that the ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport governance in the West represents the model to be emulated by the non-west. It argues that modernisation of sport is liable to take on subtly different forms in different local contexts which are modern but not uniform, supporting in effect a form of ‘multiple modernities’. Sport governance, like modernity itself, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, as its (cultural, political, and/or economic, and thus sport) forms varies as much as cultural contexts do, and their characteristics overlap rather than tend to take a unitary set of features attributable to a single model.

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?