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This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

​Through literature reviews (mainly in English and German), this review sheds light on the analytical approaches prevalent in the study of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and their outcomes before and after the Arab revolutions, and explores previous and current theoretical reflections on them. Using all of this, the study attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the various issues in the region. The first part presents the various analytical concepts and their results before the revolutions, and the second part provides an overview of the analyzes of the Arab revolutions. The third part reviews the theoretical reflections on the previous analytical approaches. Finally, the researcher makes some concluding observations.

Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

This study examines the impact of post-truth discourse during the 2019 Sudanese Revolution and the subsequent transitional period, as well as the role played by social media platforms in promoting this discourse and mobilizing broad segments of the population behind it. The study also explores the susceptibility of social media users to follow false news in contrast to their engagement with factual reporting. It argues that the Sudanese Revolution and the transitional phase (2019 – 2023) coincided with the emergence of a new media landscape rooted in a politically and socially divided environment, characterized by diverse perspectives and the growing influence of social media. These platforms played positive roles in the dynamics of the revolution, significantly contributing to the mobilization of large popular groups to participate in demonstrations and sit-ins that ultimately led to the regime's overthrow. However, they also generated confusion and uncertainty among these groups due to the rise of post-truth discourse fueled by fake news, which in turn intensified polarization among revolutionary youth and activists.

The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

العقلاني. ومثاليًا، يتمتع الناس بدرجة معينة من الاختيار فيما يتعلق بالمنطق الذي يريدون استخدامه لتحقيق أهدافهم بأفضل طريقة ولتحقيق مصالحهم". Gero Erdmann & Ulf Engel, "Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch- All Concept," GIGA Working Paper , no. 16 (2006), pp. 18-19. 32 Peter Pawelka, "Der Orientalische Staat im 21. Jahrhundert: Zur Reinkarnation des vormodernen Staates in einer globalisierten Welt," in: Peter Pawelka (ed.), Der Staat im Vorderen Orient: Konstruktion und Legitimation politischer Herrschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 42-38; B rownlee, p p. 35-36 ; Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 110-116. 33 Hazim Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in: Hazim Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London/ New York/ Sydney: Groom Helm, 1987), p. 62; Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics , vol. 53, no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 356-357; Rolf Schwarz, "The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization," Review of International Political Economy , vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 599-600; Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 116-132. 34 Schlumberger, Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt , pp. 123-129.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.