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The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

This study begins by discussing the concept of legitimacy and then examines the patterns of legitimacy in Egypt since 2013. It specifically focuses on the legitimacy of performance within the field of educational policies and its role in the regime's continuity. The study finds that the regime cannot establish its own legitimacy merely by creating an illusion of effective performance. Instead, it can manage legitimacy through several strategies: shaping public expectations by emphasizing the importance of maintaining public order and providing basic goods and services; influencing public perceptions by highlighting achievements while concealing failures and suppressing criticism; and managing citizens' perceptions of alternatives, such as Islamist groups or a descent into chaos, or both. The study also concludes that the regime's objective is not to secure genuine popular support but to ensure general compliance by persuading the majority that it is more effective in improving their lives than any alternative. This level of legitimacy may be sufficient to encourage adherence to laws and discourage efforts to replace the regime.

Despite the dire situation in Syria, the International Organization for Migration states that about one in ten Syrian refugees is returning home. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees predicts that hundreds of thousands of refugees may soon voluntarily return to their devastated homeland. The fear is that this will happen without any prior planning, especially since the Syrian crisis may be relatively unique in terms of its size and the difficulty of predicting its trajectories. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to identify the lessons learned from the experiences of refugee return, whether voluntary or forced, which illustrate the most important factors for ensuring the sustainable return of Syrian refugees. The study is based on an extensive literature review, consultations and interviews with experts and stakeholders, supported by the researchers' accumulated experience in the field of post-war reconstruction and refugee studies. The study does not aim to analyze the current political or military situation in Syria, or to evaluate any ongoing or planned political talks, nor does it evaluate any proposed political solution.

This study addresses a longstanding and renewed subject in the case of Sudan: the continual interference of military formations and elites in political authority and the instability of post-independence civil governance. It uses a compound methodology blending a historical reading of political events and developments with a descriptive reading of the present reality, in its domestic and foreign dimensions, and a forecast of Sudan's future in light of the current situation. The study observes that the plurality of regional, ethnic, and military structures, instead of being a constructive and integrating aspect of the Sudanese state and nation, has reflected negatively on the country's unity and its political and security stability. Since independence, these formations have remained in confrontation, whether between one another or among the internal parts and divisions of each. Evidence for this claim is found in Sudan's complex crises, including that of governance, the South, Darfur, the current transitional period, and the struggle for power presently raging between military branches.

The relationship between economies and polities is one of vital importance to the outcome of the contemporary intensifying struggle between authoritarians and democrats. Investigating this relationship in Egypt is therefore of relevance for the world as a whole, increasingly divided as it is between countries with political economies informed by authoritarian or democratic models. This study will explore manifestations of that vital relationship in Egypt. It will commence by outlining the global and national contexts within which the economy operates, and both shape it and present challenges that must be met to achieve more rapid growth. How economic factors have contributed to the rise of Sisi's new authoritarianism will then be investigated. This will be followed by reversing that relationship, analyzing the economic consequences of the Sisi regime. Whether those consequences will better enable Egypt to compete economically, or will undermine its capacities to do so, is addressed in the fourth section. That is followed by an effort to answer the related question of what the key building blocks of a more successful economic strategy might be. In the conclusion scenarios of alternative futures of Egypt's political economy are considered.

The Palestinian Authority today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy, has led to a situation in which the PA's days may be numbered. This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the PA's promised territory. But Palestinian society today has undergone immense transformation since 1994; Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, and its formalized institutions which have overtaken Palestinian society for the past two decades disappear, how will Palestinians respond? Will the territories degenerate into violence, or will Palestinians coordinate to undertake strategies to organize a Palestinian response? This brief review Palestinian public opinion on preferences for non-violent strategies versus violent strategies, and examines what variables impact this dynamic.

​The 20 February movement was formed out of a defining moment in modern Moroccan political history, and forced the ruling regime to undertake a process to reform and give up some of its powers. This study takes a look at the path of the 20 February movement as it took shape in 2011. It looks at the defining role played by the group in the Arab Spring protests. It analyzes the components of the movement and the stages of its development and decline in addition to presenting factors that explain the potentials and setbacks it faced months after its beginning. These are related to the existing political and social opportunities in Morocco, in particular the nature of its political system, the position of main actors, as well as the regional and international atmosphere. The social framing of the movement and the limits of its ability to instigate a wide social movement among the poor and vulnerable social classes is also considered, as well as how the movement went about promoting its ideas, apart from the difficulties related to creating a common identity that can unite its contradicting components.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?