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​​​​This study explores the trajectory of state disintegration in Sudan from 1821 to 2025, starting from a central question: does the April 2023 war constitute a revealing variable that exposes a process of structural disintegration whose foundations accumulated over time? Or is it an explanatory variable that, in itself, drives the deepening of this disintegration? Drawing on a historical sociology approach, the study analyzes the interaction of five main variables addressed in the literature on state disintegration: war, elite conflict, geostrategic intervention, erosion of legitimacy, and the pressures of globalization. The study shows that successive wars and resource depletion, along with ethnic/regional elite divisions and international competition over the Red Sea, have undermined the state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, leading to a hybrid pattern of disintegration in which the center retains international recognition while power is effectively distributed among local armed networks. The study concludes that existing models of state disintegration explain important aspects of the Sudanese experience, but require further development to accommodate forms of multiple sovereignties and managed disintegration​​

US and Gulf relations are based on more than self-interest, but common selfinterest is always a key (or the key) factor in shaping an alliance and strategic relationship. The key common self-interests that drives US and Arab Gulf relations are security – the need to deal with Iran, fighting extremism, and securing the flow of petroleum exports out of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to meet the needs of the global economy, and to provide the key source of income for the Gulf states. This study explains why the United States maintains close ties with its Arab strategic partners in the Gulf. The study finds out that the US and its Gulf strategic partners face serious challenges, including domestic political change in the US, divisions between Arab states, the impact of regional conflicts and instability, and the growing role of non-Western powers.

This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.

This study attempts to understand the concept of the "deep state" given its increasing use in political literature and analysis. This happens especially in comparative studies and, specifically, when multiple political systems are addressed. Through an analysis of the literature in which the term is used, it is clear that the concept of the "deep state" is ambiguously understood and applied. This study is based on a critical view of the concept. It assumes that the vagueness of its definition is tinged with secrecy. Its fragmented usage in a variety of political systems (democratic, semi-democratic and authoritarian), render it an analytical tool that is not useful nor capable to expand knowledge of comparative political science. In lieu of this hypothesis, the study reveals discrepancies in the usage of the concept of "deep state", in an attempt to refine the concept.

This study analyzes the path of Egypt’s January 25 Revolution and its missed opportunity for regime change. In making this case the paper begins by examining the early conflict between political parties, and the role of the former regime’s armed forces in lending legitimacy to different actors. The study also addresses the structure - or lack thereof - of the transitional phase, including the role of the Islamist movement, and the predicament that the Muslim Brotherhood faced while in power. Continuing to trace the path of the stymied revolution, this paper assesses the failures, in particular of the political parties that “inherited” the young revolutionary generation, to comprehend the meaning of the transitional phase. As such, it shows how these parties failed to make progress towards democracy, and to understand the role assigned to them immediately after the January events. The study reasserts the meaning of the terms “revolution” and “coup,” exposing the ongoing confusion around the characterization of what happened in the post-transition phase in July 2013. It also analyzes the efforts of counterrevolutionary forces to pit the “legitimacy of the street” against the “legitimacy of the people.” The paper finally comes to forecast the direction the Egyptian revolution might take, given the July 3rd ouster of Mohamed Morsi, and the events that followed.

In 2015, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a massive contentious movement, known as "You Stink", in response to the unfolding of the waste crisis when the main landfill known as "Naameh" was closed. Though other opposition movements preceded it in the post-war period, "You Stink" succeeded in positioning itself as a threat to the continuity in power of the informal pillars of political power- the "politically relevant elites". Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify first those who are influential in framing national political agendas, hence targeted by the movement itself. Second, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key activists within "You Stink", the paper provides an exploratory analysis of the zu'ama's receptivity to it, unpacking the strategies employed to neutralize the movement. It concludes that in addition to obstructive strategies put into play by the zu'ama, certain operative caveats within the movement itself, acted as "political opportunities" to the former's capacity to neutralize and weaken the movement.

The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

This paper highlights the role of the armed forces and their impact on the process of political transition, and discusses civil-military relations in their various aspects: the state, society and the armed forces per se, in order to reveal the main pillars that constitute a balance between the power of political institutions (legislative and executive) and the military power of the army. Such a balance would lead to the subduing of the army to the civil authority, and confine military activities to security and defense. The paper focuses on the common characteristics shared by states that have succeeded in building democratic armies. To conclude, the author presents a set of recommendations addressed to activists and democrats, on what ought to be done and what should be avoided in the security-defense field during the process of democratic army building.

ﻓﻲ ﺧﻀﻢ اﺧﺬ واﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤّﻰ إﻋﻼﻣﻴًﺎ "ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ"، ﺑﻴﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ا رﺑﻊ؛ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻃﺮق ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. وﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﺧﺘﻼط اوراق ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪ، اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺐ؛ ن ﺛﻤﺔ "ﺗﺸﺎﺑﻜ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، و"اﺷﺘﺒﺎﻛ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى، وﺛﻤﺔ "إﺟﻬﺎض" ﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ ﻋﺮﺑﻲﱟ ﻣﺄﻣﻮلٍ، وﺛﻤﺔ دﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮرﻳﺔ ﺿﺎرﺑﺔ ﺟﺬورﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ، وﻫﻨﺎك ﻗﻮى ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎوﻫﺎم، وأﻃﺮوﺣﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺼﺮ. ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ وﺻﻒ اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ارﺑﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﺎد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻌﺾ أنّ ﻛﻞ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ أﺻﺒﺢ وراء اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ، وﺗﻢّ ﺗﺠﺎوزه ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ أﺣﺪﺛﻬﺎ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ، وﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺪد ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﺪة أﺷﺪ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن، ارﻫﺎب. This paper will attempt to approach the present crisis between Qatar and a group of four countries formed of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt from a number of perspectives. The complexity of the present situation means that a process of deconstruction is required before the problem can be solved. Specifically, the present crisis reveals how the countries involved are both intertwined and in conflict, simultaneously; and how the players in question are in conflict over attempts to undo the Arab Spring. The conflicts between Qatar and the remaining countries have roots which stretch into history, and they also demonstrate that any belief that the birth of the modern nation-state would end those rivalries was misguided.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.