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From a purely political perspective, tyranny and oligarchic rule have continued to be the dominant characteristic of Arab politics. Authoritarianism has “strangled” the Arab citizen. Will an over-arching Arab liberal tendency be able to overcome sectarian, political and religious tensions to affect a comprehensive reform of Arab political culture? The search for a definitive answer to this question proves difficult. The presumed link between the question of (political) reform within the Arab countries, in general terms, and a liberal perspective from foreign cultural contexts is supported by only a tenuous hypothesis. Such a presumptive hypothesis cannot guarantee results in a cultural and social environment completely alien from the one in which the principles of liberalism first emerged. This author calls for a revitalized conceptualization of liberty which is culturally appropriate to the Arab context while maintaining its connection to global contemporary civilization: it would be a conceptualization which liberates Arab societies from historicism and a blatant emulation of the West.

The “zero problems” foreign-policy approach adopted by Turkey towards its neighbors, and its expansion to cover the Middle East and North African space, with which it shares an important historical and cultural field, has strengthened Turkey’s orientation towards consolidating relations with Algeria. This has also been aided by similarity in positions and views on many central issues, foremost among them the Palestinian cause which for both countries has great religious and historical symbolism, and represents a meeting point between the two countries’ positions. In this regard, Turkish diplomacy has undergone something of a change, since it began to adopt attitudes and positions hostile to Zionists, a position long held by Algerian foreign policy since independence. On this basis, the influence of religious and historical factors becomes clear in setting the new directions for Turkish foreign policy with regards to Algeria and the intensification of its efforts to consolidate relations. This can be ascribed to feelings of belonging to the Islamic nation and a shared history which form starting points for Turkish foreign policy.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

The current Sinai issue poses many questions on the nature of the escalating violence there, the reasons for its emergence

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

Book Title: The Lost Narrative [Arabic] Author: Farouk Sharaa Edition: 1st Year of publication: 2015 Publisher: ACRPS, Doha/Beirut Pages: 495

Book Title: US policy and the Management of International Crises (Iran—Iraq—Syria—Lebanon as examples) [Arabic] Author: Abada Mohammed Tamer Year of publication: 2015 Publisher: ACRPS Pages: 288

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

Examining the dimensions of the constitutional crisis in Libya, this paper begins by explaining the situation of the country’s political factions. On this backdrop, it looks at how the interim Constitutional Declaration of Libya’s 17 February revolution – which has seen seven amendments – has led to large-scale changes in the legal positions of political institutions and has caused a disturbance in the state’s constitutional framework. Analysis shows how the declaration has disrupted the country’s transitional path, and outlines the ways that this has taken place including: the diverse results from the National Congress’s legislative elections where no political party or movement secured an absolute majority, the growing disputes following the adoption of the political and administrative isolation law, and the emergence of alternative proposals for a third transitional period. This paper tackles the factors leading up to the amendments of the interim Constitutional Declaration, issued on August 3 2011, and their impact on Libya’s political crisis. Analyzing the constitutional framework allows a closer look into the role of Libyan political actors and an understanding of the elements that helped shape the path of the transitional period. It shows that the conflict over the constitutional framework has led to an armed conflict among parties to the Libyan revolution.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.