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The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

Book Title: Military Intelligence Comes to Light [Hebrew]

This paper elucidates Arab public opinion towards the international aerial campaign against ISIL (the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”) in Iraq and Syria, based on the findings of a dedicated opinion survey. The survey included representative, randomized samples in seven countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, in addition to communities of Syrian refugees in three host countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey). Respondents were asked the extent of their support for the aims of the international campaign as well as the conduct of the airstrikes. Survey questions also take in respondents’ views on a number of related issues. The findings show that the vast majority of Arabs are firmly opposed to ISIL, with only 11% of respondents expressing views which are positive, to varying extents, towards the group.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

This paper explores attitudes among Syrian refugees and displaced persons towards the presidential elections held in their country on June 3, 2014. Respondents came from refugee camps located in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan as well as internally displaced persons camps along the Syrian-Turkish frontier. Survey questions also asked respondents about their views of the existing regime and its institutions in addition to their prescriptions for an “ideal solution” to the Syrian crisis. Answers to the latter question came in three distinct categories. A clear majority (64%) which supports a change of regime as the path to an ideal solution to the Syrian conflict, in contrast to a mere 6% who support the total defeat of the opposition by the regime as an ideal end to the crisis. A third group, accounting for 23% of respondents, held that the ideal solution to the Syrian conflict would be peaceful, based on a dialogue which brought together the regime and the opposition.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

​The 20 February movement was formed out of a defining moment in modern Moroccan political history, and forced the ruling regime to undertake a process to reform and give up some of its powers. This study takes a look at the path of the 20 February movement as it took shape in 2011. It looks at the defining role played by the group in the Arab Spring protests. It analyzes the components of the movement and the stages of its development and decline in addition to presenting factors that explain the potentials and setbacks it faced months after its beginning. These are related to the existing political and social opportunities in Morocco, in particular the nature of its political system, the position of main actors, as well as the regional and international atmosphere. The social framing of the movement and the limits of its ability to instigate a wide social movement among the poor and vulnerable social classes is also considered, as well as how the movement went about promoting its ideas, apart from the difficulties related to creating a common identity that can unite its contradicting components.

Through a critical review, this paper examines the most important issues raised during the political forum for "The Washington Institute," a forum devoted to the discussion of US policies in the Middle East. This is based in a belief of the importance of critical interaction with the outcomes of policy centers in the United States, given the global significance of these centers in terms of impact on American foreign policy making or critical discussions aimed at understanding what the Washington institute promotes. A critical view is needed in particular around the Zionist and Israeli interests of the institute. The paper also focusses on the objectives of the political forum, and a call for redefining the allies of the US in the region and the establishment of a strategic constellation of allies that include Israel and other Arab countries.​

This study limits its aim to a discussion of the water policy of Egypt and Ethiopia. It will first lay out the Ethiopian view and the nation's reaction to the escalation of Egyptian media coverage calling for a direct war against Ethiopia after the country's insistence on the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which would disrupt the flow of water to Egypt. With Egypt regularly in control of 85% of the Nile's water, the dam would create a massive change in the water situation in the country. This paper shows the history of the conflict over the water of the Nile between Ethiopia (an Upstream Country) and Egypt (the only Downstream Country) and the position of Ethiopia on old agreements between the parties. The paper presents Ethiopian writings published since the revolution of January 25, 2011 by way of understanding the nation's viewpoint on the issue. ​