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This study explores the use of sports as a diplomatic soft power tool employed by states to achieve foreign policy objectives. It adopts a constructivist framework that highlights the role of symbolic factors in shaping state behaviour. Focusing on Qatar, as a small state lacking traditional power resources, the study examines how its leadership turned to alternative tools, notably sports, as a strategic means of influence. Qatari sports diplomacy relies on four main pillars: investing in global sports clubs, developing infrastructure and hosting major sporting events, investing in sports media, and supporting local sports. This strategic use of sport has contributed to redefining Qatar's role and enhancing its international standing, enabling it to exercise political and economic influence and to support the diversification of its national economy.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

Ukraine occupies a highly sensitive position between Russia and the Nato-member states because it is currently the main buffer state between them and also occupies more than half the extent of the eastern gateway to Europe, via which threats to Europe have passed throughout history. The continuation of European and Nato actions to incorporate and form partnerships with other states aims to curtail Russian influence in this region and reinforce control over it. Russia, deeply disturbed at the encroachment of Western influence to its wider immediate neighborhood, cannot abandon Ukraine to become part of the West's security and economic order. For, in addition to Russian nationalist feeling for Ukraine, it is part of its "special interest zone" and the final strategic stronghold buffering it from the West and its allies. The global tensions caused by the Ukraine crisis and the threat it poses to relations between two major global actors call for a discussion over the wider context to Ukraine's place in Western and Russian strategic thinking.

Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.

The causal link between economic and political freedom is a complex and interesting debate in the domain of social sciences. To enrich the academic debate on this issue, we have examined the Arab context based on econometric instruments, especially the test of causality. Based on the results of the study, the interactions between economic and political freedom in the Arab world appear to be generally in line with the thesis strongly defended by liberal thinkers, in particular Milton Friedman and Frederick Hayek, that there is a unilinear causality in which the first variable leads to the second. This result may seem self-evident in a transformed Arab context, but the reality seems to be more complex. Economic freedom indeed guarantees freedom, the constructing of the national identity and the conditions necessary to ensure individual well-being. However, such freedom is not understood in isolation from political freedom and its social context interactions and cultural structures, in contrast with restricted collective consciousness.

This paper shall explore the historic shift in relations which has brought Russia and Turkey closer together, with a focus on the domains in which these two powers now cooperate. It shall examine in particular the impact of this new level of cooperation on their policies in the Arab region. The specific set of economic and political circumstances prevailing at the beginning of the twenty-first century have driven Russia and Turkey to revisit the nature of their centuries-long relations, which have previously been dominated by conflict and competition for influence. As two neighboring, great powers both of which are looking to adopt a new strategy to reclaim their imperial pasts on the world stage, Russia and Turkey are now compelled to cooperate, particularly in the economic domain. Yet even as the shared interests of these two countries expand, it has not brought an end to their contradictory sets of regional alliances in the Middle East which have placed them in a zero-sum game.

The relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and its effect on the Lebanese state is here examined. Divided into five parts the study first tackles Iran’s movements in Lebanese space and their connection to Hezbollah’s evolution. The second part focuses on Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and on Hezbollah as an intervention tool. The third part describes Hezbollah’s relationship with Lebanon since the party’s creation as well as the Taif Agreement and the subsequent change in the foundations of that relationship. The fourth part sheds light on the intervention of Iran and Syria in the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Finally, the fifth part explores Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.