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The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

This article discusses the nuclear program agreement reached between the P5+1 group of nations and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article sees the agreement as a historic achievement that may well have major effects in the region. The paper deals with the main features of the agreement and the circumstances that led to it, and enumerates its likely effects on the region and especially on the Palestine-Israel conflict, as well as Israel’s frustration with the Iranian nuclear program and its threats to strike it. The paper puts forth the possibility that the agreement will lead to positive results and cause stability in the region and lead to real improvement in Iranian-Gulf relations, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as resolve the problems of Shia minorities in some Gulf states.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict during 28/2/2015-30/4/2016.

The rise of China as a new global power has placed a non-Western actor at the center of world politics; an actor with no colonial or imperialist history. Analyzing China's regional and global influence, the study follows the historical context of its rise and growth in a record period of time, making it a major global economic and military power. The study aims to shed light on the rise of Chinese Asian power, and the controversy that accompanied this. It will attempt to explain the causes that helped this rise take place and the potential for growth and development. The study also explains the obstacles that could hinder further Chinese growth and ascendancy, as well as the impact of China's rise on the world, and the regional and international positions vis-à-vis this rise.

Examining the negative effects on the economies of oil-exporting Arab countries as a result of the current imbalance in the international monetary system, this paper finds that the imbalance is mainly represented in the continuation of the dollar as the central reserve currency of the Gulf States. As long as this imbalance exists, it postulates, the surpluses achieved by these countries in their balance of foreign payments ends up as dollar-denominated reserves deposited in the US government treasury or as US bonds. In other words, as loans countries with financial surpluses Gulf States give to the richest economy in the world in return for meager interest rates instead of investing them in high-yielding productive projects that could increase demand in the global economy, drive up employment rates, and help protect against crises and instability. This study aims to start a debate about the need for the Gulf countries to take part in efforts to reform the international monetary system, and join developing nations that spend on infrastructure and sustainable development instead of on defense. This paper sees such a move as ensuring that the Gulf States would then participate in reforming global governance and the development of the international monetary system. Gulf countries should seriously consider joining the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank, as well as establish a trans-regional bank between Asian and Arab countries, as a more advanced step.

Hardly a day passes without seeing or hearing the terms 'extremism' or 'extremists.' Used today to describe political views and attitudes, or methods in political action, the terms today are linked to particular images, and hold specific implications charged with prejudice, half-truths, and presumption. This paper asks: Is the term extremism useful to understand the ideas, views, or practices of those who are labeled as such? Are there common traits among those labeled as extremist that renders this label a useful concept in the classification of the ideas of political groups and their objectives and methods? Or, is 'extremist' simply an expression of a negative attitude agreed to by those with a specific view with the aim of ostracizing specific groups? It then poses an even larger and more critical question: How do groups of people reach the point of burning bridges with existing reality in order to carry out a fight using violent methods? The paper argues that analyzing ideology per se to reach an answer to this question is futile, be this ideology nationalistic, religious, classist, or otherwise.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

One of the most important gains of Tunisia’s revolution has been that elections are no longer subject to interior ministry supervision. A look at these elections reveals a process managed by a permanent constitutional body, the Independent High Authority for Elections, which in itself marks a revolutionary success. These events are read within the context of the assassination of Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi, which caused many to worry that the democratic path would be hindered, as in other Arab Spring countries. More than the elections mechanism, this paper argues that success can also be attributed to the Troika alliance, especially the Ennahda party. It shows how the neutrality of the military institution and the great role played by the country’s General Labor Union in bridging the gap between Tunisian opponents through national dialogue, have largely contributed in the success of the elections.