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This article explains underlying drivers of the general contours of Chinese foreign policy. Since the Cold War, China has increasingly been playing the role of a major power but demonstrates hesitancy in some theatres and has not developed its full capacities to that end. This article attends to the study of “Strategic Culture”, a framework which helps explain ideas generated from the history, culture, and societal narratives of a state, and which place general parameters that indicate preferred foreign policy options. Strategic Culture does not cause action, but helps define potential acceptable options. It is complementary to other explanations around the importance of factors such as distribution of material capabilities, decision maker’s idiosyncrasies, and alliance commitments. In particular, strategic culture helps understand long-term foreign policy patterns.

​This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1/1/2016و to 29/2/2016.

Over the past thirty years, important changes have taken place in Israeli attitudes towards the Haram Al Sharif, at both the popular and governmental levels, specifically with regards to the conduct of Jewish prayers at the site and messianic calls for the construction of the “Third Temple”. This paper traces a turning point among both religious and secular Jewish Israelis in the traditional religious view that had long admonished observant Jews from visiting the Haram Al Sharif. The paper highlights the growth of Jewish terrorist groups since the mid-1980s that aim to destroy the existing Muslim holy sites on the Haram Al Sharif, including the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, to make way for the Third Temple. Finally, the paper provides an overview of the changes already made by Israel to the Haram Al Sharif site.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

​A one-day academic symposium hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will bring together experts from Russia, the Arab world and the region to examine Moscow’s latest military intervention in Syria, on Saturday, October 24, 2015. While Russia’s decision to intervene directly in the conflict in Syria comes as the culmination of more than four years of diplomatic and military support for the Assad regime, the move by the Kremlin to deploy its military forces has come as a surprise to many observers, becoming a turning point not only in the militarized revolution within Syria, but also in the broader Middle East and indeed in a larger global arena. To better study the circumstances which gave rise to the Russian maneuver and the outcomes likely to result from it, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will convene “Russian Military Intervention in Syria: Motives, Objectives and Repercussions”. In the highly volatile climate which the Middle East is presently witnessing, selected participants at the meeting will be asked to examine the fallout of Russia’s actions on the future stability of the region.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.