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Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?

ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺤﺪدات اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ اﻳﺮاﻧﻲ ﻣﻦ ا زﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮاﻣﻲ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻨﻊ أيّ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻴﺎ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻜﺎﺳﺐ ﻃﻬﺮان ﻣﻦ اﺳﺘﻤﺮار ا زﻣﺔ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﺧﺴﺎرة اﻟﺮﻳﺎض ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﻠﻔﺎﺋﻬﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ وﺧﺎرﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، وﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﺴﺎﺋﺮﻫﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ أﻳﻀ - ﺎ ﻟﻮ ﻃﺎل أﻣﺪ ازﻣﺔ أو اﺗﺠﻬﺖ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻤﺆﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻬﺎ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ ا ﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ - ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى. وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺼﻮﻣﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، ﺗﻤﻴﻞ دواﺋﺮ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﺪة ﻓﻲ ﻃﻬﺮان إﻟﻰ اﺗﺨﺎذ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﺣﺬر ﻣﻦ ازﻣﺔ، ﺧﺸﻴﺔ ﺗﺒﻌﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ وإﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ؛ إذ ﻻ ﺗﺒﺪو إﻳﺮان اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ وﺿﻊ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺟﻴﺪ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺠﻦ ﻣﻜﺎﺳﺐ ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻤﻨ ﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ. ﻟﺬﻟﻚ، رﺑﻤﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺨﺮاط ﻓﻲ أزﻣﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة، ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ وﺟﻮد إدارة أﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﺎﺻﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺪاء وﺗﻔﺮض ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮﺑﺎت. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، إﻳﺮان، ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ. This paper explores the determinants of Iran's stance towards the 2017 intra-GCC Crisis, in which the country opposes alterations to the political geography of the Gulf. The author demonstrates how Tehran simultaneously benefits from the loss of Saudi Arabia of some of its allies and stands to lose from increased American involvement in the event that the conflict is prolonged. Despite its long-standing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, many Iranian decision-makers are cautious with regards to the intra-GCC crisis, fearing the possible regional or global fallout of a more involved role. Lacking tangible benefits from the nuclear deal with the P51+ group of countries, official Iran seems reluctant to involve itself in a crisis which could complicate both its domestic political situation and its foreign relations, especially in light of a hostile US Administration.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,Syria and Yemen.

Eastern Sudan is in a critical stage, where local fault lines intersect with Horn of Africa tensions and regional and international ambitions. This study traces those fissures and their intersections in order to understand and analyze the conflict in the region. Its basic premise is that eastern Sudan represents the priority and geographical entry point in the Sudanese peace-building process, and that the establishment/strengthening of peace in this region is linked to a reciprocal relationship with the security and stability of the Horn of Africa. The study presents preliminary ideas, in terms of preventive diplomacy, that may contribute to healing the rifts. It is based on a combination of primary sources, literature, and personal interviews with Sudanese academics, diplomats and other actors. In addition, it builds on the outputs of two workshops from the Sudan Track II Peace Dialogue Project. It frames some aspects of the analysis and ideas presented with a set of theories and hypotheses that intersect with the field of conflict studies, following the "combined approach," for studying complex conflict environments.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.