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This study deals with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as a non-state actor. It examines the internal environment in Turkey and the PKK's material strength before moving on to the external environment and the PKK's entry into an international conflict, focusing on historical development since the end of the Cold War. The paper argues that non-state actors contribute to international anarchy and conflict through competition with the state over the monopoly of power and the acquisition of territory, identity and resources. It also stipulates that the PKK benefited from the internal and external environmental variables contributing to international conflict. The study concludes that the entry of the PKK, which originated in Turkey, into an international conflict took place in several stages: the competition with the state for power; the influence of its foreign policy choices; the acquisition of new territories; and extra-territorial action.

The “zero problems” foreign-policy approach adopted by Turkey towards its neighbors, and its expansion to cover the Middle East and North African space, with which it shares an important historical and cultural field, has strengthened Turkey’s orientation towards consolidating relations with Algeria. This has also been aided by similarity in positions and views on many central issues, foremost among them the Palestinian cause which for both countries has great religious and historical symbolism, and represents a meeting point between the two countries’ positions. In this regard, Turkish diplomacy has undergone something of a change, since it began to adopt attitudes and positions hostile to Zionists, a position long held by Algerian foreign policy since independence. On this basis, the influence of religious and historical factors becomes clear in setting the new directions for Turkish foreign policy with regards to Algeria and the intensification of its efforts to consolidate relations. This can be ascribed to feelings of belonging to the Islamic nation and a shared history which form starting points for Turkish foreign policy.

Book Title: National Intellectual Capital and the Financial Crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand Author: Carol Yeh-Yun Lin, Leif Edvinsson, Jeffrey Chen, Tord Beding Year of publication: 2014 Publisher: Springer, New York Pages: 100

Eastern Sudan is in a critical stage, where local fault lines intersect with Horn of Africa tensions and regional and international ambitions. This study traces those fissures and their intersections in order to understand and analyze the conflict in the region. Its basic premise is that eastern Sudan represents the priority and geographical entry point in the Sudanese peace-building process, and that the establishment/strengthening of peace in this region is linked to a reciprocal relationship with the security and stability of the Horn of Africa. The study presents preliminary ideas, in terms of preventive diplomacy, that may contribute to healing the rifts. It is based on a combination of primary sources, literature, and personal interviews with Sudanese academics, diplomats and other actors. In addition, it builds on the outputs of two workshops from the Sudan Track II Peace Dialogue Project. It frames some aspects of the analysis and ideas presented with a set of theories and hypotheses that intersect with the field of conflict studies, following the "combined approach," for studying complex conflict environments.

Brazil is considered a rising power in the world order of the post-Cold War era, and some see it as an emerging middle power. Several motives and caveats drive Brazil’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring revolutions. Brazil decided not to get involved in the affairs of the Arab world and carefully observed the internal developments in Arab countries and the role of some intervening foreign powers. It also reiterated that the West’s military intervention in the affairs of Arab countries is selective and causes more harm than good. Brazil’s reactions varied, as did its stances and ways of addressing the Arab revolutions. The paper explores and analyzes the conflicting Brazilian reactions and assesses the factors behind the different views. It also mentions some expected outcomes of the Brazilian stance and the possible repercussions on Brazil’s international role and economic interests in the Arab region.

This study discusses successive Palestinian governments and provides a reading of their features, focusing on the 15th, 16th and 17th governments, five years after Rami Hamdallah became prime minister. The first section examines the emergence and development of governments since 1994. The second section gives an overview of the three cabinets in question and their agendas while the third section examines the failures of these governments and the impact of that failure on the Palestinian political scene. The final section examines the traditional operating assumptions of the political system. The study argues that the origin of the problem lies in the political system that has emerged since 1994 which restricts the operations of Palestinian governments, and that the formation of "technocratic" cabinets has only exacerbated the Palestinian political crisis.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has traversed several stages of political and constitutional reforms. These were characterized by a restructuring of the political field in keeping with constitutional methodology and political consensus and were the precondition for the process of rapprochement between political actors. However, if this rapprochement or political openness transformed the electoral process into something diminished in practical terms, it in turn intensified the expansion of the protest arena, the accumulation of skills and experience among protesters, the development of more independent coordination capabilities, and the weakening of the regime's polarizing tendencies. This development imposes upon the political class a renewal of its discourse and means and modalities of communication, in the short and medium terms, to prevent continued erosion of its credibility.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.