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At the beginning of August 2014 clashes broke out in the Lebanese town of Ersal between armed factions fighting in Syria, among them jihadist groups such as ISIL and the Nusra Front, and the Lebanese army. These clashes continued for five days and ended with the withdrawal of the Syrian fighters from the town as part of an initiative under the auspices of the Association of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon and the Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE). In view of the contradictory accounts and the mutual recriminations, this paper looks at what really happened in Ersal, the background that led the crisis to develop, the positions and calculations of the various sides, and the repercussions in Syria and Lebanon.

Brazil is considered a rising power in the world order of the post-Cold War era, and some see it as an emerging middle power. Several motives and caveats drive Brazil’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring revolutions. Brazil decided not to get involved in the affairs of the Arab world and carefully observed the internal developments in Arab countries and the role of some intervening foreign powers. It also reiterated that the West’s military intervention in the affairs of Arab countries is selective and causes more harm than good. Brazil’s reactions varied, as did its stances and ways of addressing the Arab revolutions. The paper explores and analyzes the conflicting Brazilian reactions and assesses the factors behind the different views. It also mentions some expected outcomes of the Brazilian stance and the possible repercussions on Brazil’s international role and economic interests in the Arab region.

​The Contemporary Syrian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a two-day workshop on November 17 and 18, 2013 during which a group of distinguished Syrian academics, statesmen and political activists discussed a proposed plan for the democratization of Syria which was published earlier in 2013 by the Syrian Expertise Bureau in coordination with the Syrian Studies Center.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.

This paper explores attitudes among Syrian refugees and displaced persons towards the presidential elections held in their country on June 3, 2014. Respondents came from refugee camps located in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan as well as internally displaced persons camps along the Syrian-Turkish frontier. Survey questions also asked respondents about their views of the existing regime and its institutions in addition to their prescriptions for an “ideal solution” to the Syrian crisis. Answers to the latter question came in three distinct categories. A clear majority (64%) which supports a change of regime as the path to an ideal solution to the Syrian conflict, in contrast to a mere 6% who support the total defeat of the opposition by the regime as an ideal end to the crisis. A third group, accounting for 23% of respondents, held that the ideal solution to the Syrian conflict would be peaceful, based on a dialogue which brought together the regime and the opposition.

This study evaluates the impact of US aid on Egypt's democratic transition process following the January 2011 revolution. It uses a broader theoretical and analytical framework to explain the role of external forces in the democratic transition in authoritarian countries, specifically looking at US policy towards the spread of democracy in Arab countries and, focusing on Egypt. The study also assesses the scale, objectives and impact of US aid provided to Egypt after the revolution. It is premised on the principle that the quantitative nature of aid may help better understand the priorities of US foreign policy among other factors. The study concludes by recommending the management of the public debate on the role of US aid to spread democracy in Egypt, in light of results revealing the scale, spending avenues and the potential impact of such aid.

The youth revolution in Yemen at the beginning of 2011 kindled a ray of hope that the walls of tyranny could be broken down and the country could be pulled back from the clutches of narrowly defined identities. It sharpened the will that formed a “historical bloc” capable of rendering democratic transition successful. However, the youth revolution never transcended the ecstasy of a romantic revolutionary act to reach the stage of building institutions capable of enforcing respect for the law and accommodating ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political pluralism. This study addresses the impact of the Saudi-Iranian role on Yemen's transition. It is premised on considerable importance attached regional factors, which perhaps have even greater influence than domestic factors on the outcome of the Yemeni revolution. The study stresses that the effects and limits of regional factors are related to several variables, such as the vicissitudes of international politics; international and regional balances and interests; as well as the strategic location of the country subject to interference; its resources; its internal dynamics; the maturity of local elites; the weight of political opposition; and the quality of institutions.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.