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Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

An analysis of the strategic documents produced by the United States can play a significant role in understanding the comprehensive visions of successive administrations in dealing with the outside world. However, these documents cannot present a day-to-day picture of what a given administration might do amid rapidly evolving crises. In analyzing each document, these day-to-day strategic concerns, which in fact govern each US strategic document, must be taken into account. This study attempts to analyze the text of the 2015 UN national security strategy by taking into account the international context, its goals, priorities, and governing principles. The analysis carries out an assessment of six key strategic indicators in the strategy document, as well as nine indicators of change compared to the 2010 document. This paints a picture of the larger vision of the Obama administration and the White House, which will shape US foreign and security policy until the end of his term.

Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

Changes in the methods and tactics of terrorist groups have triggered continuous and permanent legislative change nationally and internationally.

A convergence of interests between the Houthi militia and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh have served to undermine the National Dialogue for the country, which had earlier formed an implementation mechanism for the GCC Initiative. Previously, the aims of that Dialogue were intended to further the cause of a federalist, democratic state which decentralized power. This would have changed the status quo, in which power was concentrated in what Yemenis call the “Holy Center”, a tribalist-sectarian concentration of political and financial power which been in place for a millennium and which survived into the reborn, unified and modern-day Yemen of 1994.

Borders between Morocco and Algeria have been closed since the Hotel Atlas Asni terrorist attacks in Marrakech on August 24, 1994. Investigations found the groups that carried out the attacks had their origins in Algeria. Moroccan authorities responded by implementing a visa requirement for Algerians, and Algeria retaliated by closing the borders between the two countries. This paper looks for a solution to the re-normalization of relations between the two countries. Looking at the history of Moroccan-Algerian relations, it focuses on the Marrakech incident and the issue of Western Sahara, and their impact on the bilateral relations within a context of tension, and regional competition where each remains entrenched.

This study investigates the causes beneath the absence of non-Western theorizing efforts in the field of International Relations (IR), aiming to shed light on intellectually and politically defectiveness of the Arab World in the field, as manifested since the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. To this end, the study discusses the position of the Arab World in IR and illustrates how the North (the Centre) deliberately ignores knowledge production on international relations from the South (the Periphery) through abstraction, reductionism, and exclusion. Finally, the study scrutinizes how the situation in the Arab World reflects the continuation of colonialism in two evident forms: epistemologically through the knowledge-power nexus; and by subjugation or keeping states, even those that are nominally independent, subservient to the Great Powers in international politics.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

Yemen’s Comprehensive National Dialogue document presents a key moment in the nation’s contemporary political situation. This paper examines the document with the aim of answering questions like: What are the document’s real outcomes? To what extent does the National Dialogue document meet the objectives of February 2011 revolution and the ambitions of the Yemeni people of building a civil democratic modern country? What are the winning and losing powers in this dialogue? To what extent can the damaged powers hinder the implementation of the dialogue’s outcome? To what extent can the political and social beneficiaries apply pressure on different official and unofficial actors to implement the outcomes of the conference? What are the outcomes that might be implemented and those of which implementations might face obstacles? Giving background to the document and the situation in Yemen, the paper makes an analysis of the document and forecasts its chance of success.​