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This study analyzes the path of Egypt’s January 25 Revolution and its missed opportunity for regime change. In making this case the paper begins by examining the early conflict between political parties, and the role of the former regime’s armed forces in lending legitimacy to different actors. The study also addresses the structure - or lack thereof - of the transitional phase, including the role of the Islamist movement, and the predicament that the Muslim Brotherhood faced while in power. Continuing to trace the path of the stymied revolution, this paper assesses the failures, in particular of the political parties that “inherited” the young revolutionary generation, to comprehend the meaning of the transitional phase. As such, it shows how these parties failed to make progress towards democracy, and to understand the role assigned to them immediately after the January events. The study reasserts the meaning of the terms “revolution” and “coup,” exposing the ongoing confusion around the characterization of what happened in the post-transition phase in July 2013. It also analyzes the efforts of counterrevolutionary forces to pit the “legitimacy of the street” against the “legitimacy of the people.” The paper finally comes to forecast the direction the Egyptian revolution might take, given the July 3rd ouster of Mohamed Morsi, and the events that followed.

In this study, the researcher builds on the idea he presented in a previous study on “Symbolic Liberalism”, which he used to describe the responses of social sciences to the ailments of late modernity. This modernity is characterized by a blend, where it is defined as classical liberalism but politically illiberal. The study argues that this modernity is undergoing polarization across various societies, including on university campuses and in the media. This is evident through high levels of intolerance that have surfaced in discussions on political, cultural, and social issues, where bias and taking sides prevail over the use of strong, persuasive arguments. This intolerance comes from both the left and the right, manifesting in what is known as "cancel culture" on both sides. The spread of "over-safety culture" among administrative officials has led to hasty decisions and sanctions against some university professors, merely for using certain references in class or for not providing prior warnings to students, all within an atmosphere of fear. The study provides examples from the United States and France, often driven by symbolic liberals. Following this, provide a case related to the ongoing war in Gaza.

​​​Book Title: When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans. Author: Sharath Srinivasan. Publisher: C. Hurst & Co. Year of Publication: 2021. Number of Pages: 381.​

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

Palestine Over Two Months 1/9-31/10/2020

Libyan crisis has been scrutinized through many analytical tools in order to understand its dynamics of escalation and ways to de-escalation, however, literature on the topic often focus on purely political and security variables. This study aims at tracing insights the political economy may provide to the crisis in Libya. First, some economic variables that give analytical significance to "Need" and "Greed" understandings has been presented, which confirms that they are not less important as compared to those brought from "Creed" and that a better understanding of the Libyan case as most of internal crises and conflicts requires that light being shed on political, social and economic interpretations alike. The study concludes that political economy understandings could be useful to de-escalation efforts through a package of measures.

In recent years, phrases such as “migrant crisis” and “illegal migration” have gained increased currency as means of describing larger waves of migration to Europe. International law rests on the assumption that refuge and asylum are always “legitimate”, thus failing to provide a justification for the use of terms such as “illegal migration”. As a response, in this paper the author adopts the term “illicit migration” to refer to undeclared migration which does not pass through official channels, and which, he argues, is a clearer expression of the phenomenon currently underway, in which large numbers of migrants seek to secretly enter the borders of their destination countries. The topic under discussion has particular importance due to the reflexive way in which European countries tie migration to extremism. This has spurred European nations to increase reliance on an “iron shield” erected to isolate themselves from those landing on their shores from the southern end of the Mediterranean, and with no distinctions made between refugees legitimately seeking refuge from armed conflict and those seeking to “ride the wave”.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.